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Evolutionism 


and 


Idealism  in  Ethics 


/  ////,  A.B.,  A.M.,  Ph.D. 


OMAHA,   NEBRASKA 
1909 


\.  • 


XI  I       x  x     A 

Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 

i  2007  with  funding  from 

licrosoft  Corporation 


Evolutionism  and  Idealism 
in  Ethics 


Thesis  accepted  by  the  Faculty 
of  the  University  of  Nebraska 
for  the  Ph.  D.  degree  in  Ethics  and 
Mataphysics. 


BY 


FREDERICK  COHN,  A.  B.,  A.  M. 

(University  of  Cincinnati.) 


•  .  t  ,    •  •    •  ' • 


OMAHA,   NEBRASKA 

PRESS  OF  DOUGLAS  PRINTING   CO. 
I9O9 


7^/33 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Introduction    ..••••••'•     5 

CHAPTER  I. 
Evolutionism " 

CHAPTER  II. 

Evolutionary  Ethics — Herbert  Spencer     .  .  .  .10 

Part       I.  Ethical  Aim  of  Spencer's  Philosophy.  Scien- 
tific Character. 
Part     II.  Origin  of  the  Moral  Sense 
Part  III.  Hedonistic  Utilitarianism 
Part  IV.  Justice 
Part     V.  Negative  and  Positive  Beneficence 

CHAPTER  III. 

Evolution  of  Ethics — Darwin,  Sutherland,  Kropotkin  .        .     28 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Idealism — Immanuel  Kant       ......       4° 

CHAPTER  V. 

Summary  and  Criticism 47 

CHAPTER  VI. 
Convergence 54 


CHAPTER  VII. 

Reconciliation     .... 


60 


292740 


Evolutionism  and  Idealism 
in  Ethics. 


INTRODUCTION. 

"The  key  to  the  ancient  philosophy  is  found,"  remarks  Mar- 
tineau,1  "in  a  distinction  which  our  language  does  not  enable  us  ac- 
curately to  express;  viz.,  between  einai  and  gignesthai, — Seyn  und 
Werden, — absolute  existence  and  relative  phenomena." 

"The  key  to  the  modern  philosophy,"  continues  the  same  eminent 
writer,  "is  found  in  quite  a  different  distinction,  viz.,  that  between 
the  subjective  and  objective — between  the  mind,  as  constituted  seat 
and  principle  of  thought,  and  the  scene  or  data  assigned  it  to  think. 
To  determine  what  belongs  to  the  Ego  and  what  to  the  non-Ego  is 
the  great  problem  of  recent  times ;  the  answer  to  which  is  idealistic 
and  realistic  in  proportion  as  it  gives  ascendency  to  the  former  or  to 
the  latter  as  the  source  of  our  cognitions. "- 

Evolutionism  and  Idealism  are  the  two  great  systems  that  dom-# 
inate  thought  to-day.  They  divide  between  them  the  realm  of  philo- 
sophic interest  and  inquiry.  Each  has  its  able  advocates  and  ex- 
pounders. From  their  mutual  contact  and  reciprocal  influence  pro- 
ceed the  best  currents  in  the  higher  thought  and  scientific  specula- 
tion of  our  day. 

It  is  the  purpose  of  these  pages  to  consider  Evolutionism  and 
Idealism  with  particular  reference  to  Ethics, — their  bearing  on,  spe- 
cial character  in,  and  general  significance  for,  this  most  important  of 
the  sciences.3 


1   Types  of  Ethical  Theory,  Vol.  1.     Introd.   p.   1. 

a  ibid,  p.  2. 

3  "The  supreme  humau   science."     (Alexander,   Moral   Order  and    Progress, 


P.   200). 


.    EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS. 

CHAPTER  I. 


EVOLUTIONISM. 

By  evolutionism  we  mean  the  ideas  and  doctrines  connected 
with  the  general  theory  of  evolution. 

Evolution  is  the  theory  of  development.  It  is  associated  par- 
ticularly and  classically  with  the  name  of  Herbert  Spencer,  who  may 
be  said,  in  modern  times,  to  have  been  its  founder  and  chief  ex- 
ponent, and  whose  great  distinction  it  is  to  have  elaborated  and  sys- 
tematically formulated  its  ideas,  and  to  have  applied  them  to  the 
whole  realm  of  human  knowledge  in  his  monumental  life-work,  the 
imposing  volumes  of  the  Synthetic  Philosophy.1 

Evolution  includes  also  what  is  known  as  Darwinism,  which, 
however,  is  restricted  to  the  scientific  explanation  of  the  development 
of  species  in  plants  and  in  animals,  through  struggle  for  life  and 
variation  due  to  natural  selection  with  resulting  survival  of  the 
fittest,  as  set  forth  by  Darwin  in  his  epoch-making  work,  "The  Origin 
of  Species"  (1859).  Evolution  is  the  broader  term  referring  to  the 
development  of  the  universe. 

Stated  briefly,  Evolution  is  the  development  of  the  simple  into 
the  complex.  In  one  word,  it  is  "complexity."  "Evolution  means 
growing  complexity."  2  In  Spencer's  own  more  technical  language, 
it  is  the  change  "from  a  simple  homogeneity  to  a  complex  hetero- 
geneity." The  law  is  variously  stated  in  Spencer's  writings  and  even 
itself  underwent  development  3  in  the  progress  of  his  thought ;  but 
always  with  the  same  fundamental  factors,  reaching  its  final,  most 
complete  expression  in  what  may  be  termed  the  formula  of  evolution, 
— "a  continuous  change  from  indefinite,  incoherent  homogeneity  to 
definite,  coherent  heterogeneity  of  structure  and  function,  through 
successive  differentiations  and  integrations." 4  Always  it  implies 
growth,  progress,  development  in  conformity  with  the  laws  of  life 
and  through  the  adjustment  of  inner  relations  to  outer  relations — 

1  Mackintosh,   From  Comte  to  Benjamin  Kidd,   p.  83. 

2  Ibid,   p.  67.     Schurinan,   Import  of  Darwinism,   p.   53. 

3  Hudson.      Philosophy    of   Herbert    Spencer,    p.    82    ff;    also    MacPherson, 
Spencer  and  Spencerism,  p.  48  ff. 

4  Hudson,  p.  88.     Cf.  Spencer,  First  Principles,  Sec.  145. 


EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS.  7 

which  constitutes,  indeed,  the  essence  or,  at  all  events,  the  definition 
of  life. 

The  idea  of  evolution  was  not  absolutely  new.1  It  existed  al- 
ready among  the  ancients,  in  Hindu  Cosmogonies,  notably  among 
the  Greeks,  and  was  the  distinguishing  doctrine  of  Heraclitus,2  with 
his  famous  theory  of  Becoming.  "The  general  conception  of  system- 
atic growth,  advance,  or  orderly  progression  from  matter  to  life,  from 
the  polyp  to  man,  from  the  atom  to  the  cosmos,  was  as  familiar  to 
Greek  thought  as  to  modern  evolutionary  science.  The  Greek  nat- 
ural philosophers  held  that  the  course  of  the  world  consisted  in  a 
gradual  transition  from  the  indeterminate  to  the  determinate,  so  that 
higher  and  more  complex  forms  of  existence  follow  and  depend  on 
the  lower  and  simpler  forms."3"  In  1755  Kant,  in  his  "Theory  of 
The  Heavens,"  in  the  so-called  Nebular  Hypothesis,  endeavored  to 
trace  the  evolution  of  the  universe  from  primitive  star-dust  to  the 
present  cosmos  ;4  and  the  conception  of  evolution  became  through 
him  well-known  in  German  philosophy,  and  also  through  the  sys- 
tems of  Schelling  and  Hegel.  But  it  was  only  after  the  great  biolo- 
gical investigations  of  the  eighteenth  century,  and  the  researches  and 
discoveries  in  the  fields  of  botany,  geology  and  astronomy ;  after  the 
labors  of  Goethe  in  Germany,  Geoffry  St.  Hilaire,  Lamarck,  and 
Laplace  in  France,  Erasmus  Darwin  and  Lyell  in  England  and 
particularly  Charles  Darwin,  and  the  publication  of  the  latter's 
epoch-making  "Origin  of  Species"  (1859),  with  its  theory  of  natural 
selection  which  first  put  the  doctrine  of  evolution  on  a  scientific 
basis,^  Darwin  being  the  first  to  discover  an  adequate  scientific  cause 
to  explain  the  variation  of  species,  and  the  principle,  or  as  Schurman 
suggests,  "mechanism,"5  of  development)  that  the  idea  of  evolution 
assumed  new  and  momentous  importance,  and  was  applied  with 
thorough-going,  scientific  exactness  to  the  whole  realm  of  knowledge 
with  most  fruitful  result  and  with  radical  and  even  revolutionary 
effect.  ^  The  idea  and  the  philosophy  of  evolution  have  dominated 
the  thought  of  the  latter  half  of  the  nineteenth  century.  All  the 
sciences  have  been  re-written,  re-classified,  transformed.  Its  in- 
fluence has  been  remarkable,  and  after  half  a  century  is  still  felt 

1  Schurman,  I.  of  D.,  p.  43  ff. 

2  Cf.    Windleband,  Hist,  of  Phil.,  p.  47  ff. 

3  Schurman,   p.  47. 

4  Ibid,  p.  50.    Fiske,  Outlines  of  Cosmic  Philosophy,  Vol.  II.,  p.  325. 

5  p.  54. 


8  EVOLUTIONISM    AND     IDEALISM    IN     ETHICS. 

in  most  positive  ways,  with  vivifying  force,  and  illuminating  and 
productive  power. 

Probably  in  no  realm  did  the  theory  of  evolution,  and  what 
is  implied  in  evolutionism,  produce  such  a  tremendous  effect,  and 
have  such  a  remarkable  influence,  as  in  the  sphere  of  ethics  and  its 
allied  province  of  religion.1  Here,  from  the  first,  it  encountered  the 
strongest  opposition,  and  met  with  the  fiercest  criticism  and  denuncia- 
tion.2. It  was  felt  by  the  advocates  of  the  traditional  theories  of  mor- 
ality and  religion,  not  merely  vitally  to  effect,  but  completely  to  un- 
dermine them,  to  be  thoroughly  subversive  of  their  fundamental 
positions  and  distinctions,  and  absolutely  destructive  of  all  for  which 
they  stood.  Its  influence  upon  them  was  believed  to  be  wholly  bane- 
ful. Evolutionism  in  the  realm  of  ethics  and  religion  seemed  to  be 
synonymous  not  merely  with  materialism,  but  with  the  rankest 
sensualism  and  with  atheism.  Its  leaders  and  expounders  have  been 
held  up  to  the  greatest  ridicule,  subjected  to  every  species  of  mis- 
representation, scientific  and  popular,  and  have  even  been  regarded 
as  enemies  of  society  and  foes  of  civilization  and  the  race.  Every 
new  book  which  professed  to  treat  morality  and  religion  from  the 
standpoint  of  evolution  was  treated  with  scant  courtesy  and  with 
ironical  and  contemptuous  disdain ;  and  that,  too,  not  only  by  bigots, 
and  ignorant  and  fanatic  persons,  but  by  men  with  pretensions  to 
scholarship  and  scientific  and  philosophical  equipment.3 

In  recent  years  there  has  been  a  complete  change.  The  doctrine 
of  evolution,  while  by  no  means  universally  accepted  as  a  fact,  has 
at  least  commended  itself  to  a  constantly  increasing  number  of 
minds.  The  idea,  even  as  a  "working-principle,"  has  been  found  of 
the  greatest  helpfulness  and  creative  usefulness.  And  to-day,  in  the 
realms  of  ethics  and  religion,  too,  in  the  most  careful  and  profound 
works,  the  idea  of  evolution  is  applied,  or  at  least  considered,  in  a 
wholly  dispassionate,  calm,  and  scientific  spirit.4  "Now  every  year, 
and  almost  every  month,  brings  with  it  a  fresh  supply  of  books, 
pamphlets,  and  magazine  articles  on  'The  Evolution  of  Morality,' 

1  Williams.  Review  *of  Evolutional  Ethics,  p.  I. 

2  Macpherson  instances  the  attack  of  Hugh  Miller,  p.  88,  note.  Cf.  Bowne's 
book  on  Spencer. 

3  Schurman's  Kantian  Ethics  and  Ethics  of  Evolution,  published  as  late 
as  1881,  is  not  free  from  this  hostile  animus.  Bixby'l  Crisis  in  Morals  is 
more  fair. 

4  T.  H.  Green.  Prolegomena  to  Ethics,  p.  87. 


EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS.  g 

'L'Evolution  de  la  Morale,'  'Die  Evolution  der  Sittlichkeit,' 
'Sittlichkeit  und  Darwinismus,'  "  x  etc.  The  author  of  the  foregoing 
quotation  has  made  an  independent  study  of  no  less  than  thirteen 
writers  on  evolutional  ethics,  whose  books  he  refers  to  as  a  "few" 
that  are  "most  prominent."  Among  these,  besides  Darwin,  Wallace, 
Haeckel,  Spencer  and  Fiske,  are  Leslie  Stephen  2  and  S.  Alexander.3 
In  the  less  than  fifteen  years  since  his  review  was  written  there  have 
appeared, — to  name  only  the  most  important, — Huxley's  "Evolution 
and  Ethics"  (1894),  Drummond's  "Ascent  of  Man"  (1894),  A.  Suth- 
erland's "Origin  and  Growth  of  the  Moral  Instinct"  (2  Vols.  1898), 
P.  Kropotkin's  "Mutual  Aid:  A  Factor  in  Evolution"  (1902),  West- 
ermarck's  "Origin  and  Development  of  Moral  Ideas"  (1906),  and 
"Morals  in  Evolution :  A  Study  in  Comparative  Ethics"  (L.  T.  Hob- 
house,  1907,  2  Vols.)  ;  also  "Darwinism  and  the  Problems  of  Life" 
(Conrad  Guenther,  translated  by  Joseph  McCabe,  1907). 

All  of  these  works  treat  of  ethics  as  affected  by,  or  viewed  from, 
the  standpoint  of  evolution  or  development. 

1  Williams,  R.  of  E.  E.   (1893),  p.  2. 

2  Science  of  Ethics   (1882). 

3  Moral  Order  and  Progress  (1889). 


EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS. 

CHAPTER  II. 


THE  EVOLUTIONARY  ETHICS— HERBERT  SPENCER. 

PART  I. 

Ethical  Aim  of  Spencer's  Philosophy.   Scientific  Character. 

"The  application  of  evolution  to  morals,"  remarks  Professor 
Alexander,1  "may  mean  only  the  employment  of  biological  ideas ;  or 
it  may  mean  that  morals  must  be  treated  as  one  part  of  a  compre- 
hensive view  of  the  universe,  in  which  a  steady  development  may  be 
observed  from  the  lowest  to  the  highest  phenomena,2  and  a  devolp- 
ment,  it  may  be  added,  which  follows  the  law  of  the  survival  of  the 
fittest."  8 

The  essential  character  of  the  evolutionary  ethics,  in  all  its 
phases,  may  best  be  understood  from  a  study  of  the  ethical  writings 
of  Herbert  Spencer,  their  original  and  typical  expounder  and  "most 
influential  teacher." 4  All  the  prominent  writers  on  evolutionary 
morals  either  derive  their  theories  directly  from  him  or  have  been 
largely  influenced  by  his  speculations  and  conclusions. 

Spencer's  ethics  are  to  be  found,  (besides  in  "Social  Statics,"  his 
first  work,  1850)  mainly  in  his  great  ethical  treatises  which  form  a 
part  of  his  Synthetic  Philosophy,  "The  Principles  of  Morals,"  pub- 
lished in  three  volumes  (1893).  These  were  divided  into  parts,  of 
which  Part  I  of  Vol.  I  had  already  appeared  as  (substantially  the 
same)  the  "Data  of  Ethics"  (1876).  Part  II  contained  "The  Induc- 
tions of  Ethics,"  while  Part  III  treated  of  "The  Ethics  of  Individual 
Life."  Part  IV  constituted  "Justice"  (published  in  advance,  1891). 
Parts  V  and  VI,  completing  the  Ethics,  treated  of  "Negative  and 
Positive  Beneficence"   (1893). 

These  ethical  writings  formed  a  part  of  Spencer's  general  sys- 
tem of  Evolution,  and  indeed  a  highly  important,  and  even  a  main 
part.  We  have  warrant  for  considering  them  the  crown  and  cul- 
mination of  Spencer's  whole  system  of  thinking.  In  his  "Autobio- 
graphy" 5  he  expressly  says,  "The  whole  system  was  at  the  outset, 

1  M.  o.  &  P.,  p.  14. 

2  As  in  Westermarck,  Hobhouse;  historical  ethics. 

3  His    own    original    contribution,    regarding    the    growth    of   a    new    ideal 
as   analogous  to   growth   of   new   species   in   organic   world.     His   struggle   of 
ideals  Mackintosh  characterizes  as  a  "bloodless  and  well-nigh  painless  Darwin 
ism."     (Fr.  C  to  K.,  p.  149). 

4  Sidgwick,  History  of  Ethics,  p.  255. 

5  Vol.  II.,  p.  369. 


EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS.  IX 

and  has  ever  continued  to  be,  a  basis  for  a  right  rule  of  life,  in- 
dividual and  social."  Spencer's  interest,  then,  was  primarily  ethical. 
I  deem  this  fact  most  striking,  and  of  the  highest  importance  in 
properly  weighing  and  estimating  Spencer's  philosophy,1  and  assign- 
ing it  place  and  rank  among  other  systems.  It  was,  properly  speak- 
ing, no  speculative  interest,  but  a  practical  bias,  that  led  him  to 
formulate  his  great  laws  of  thought,  and  set  forth  so  comprehensively 
and  exhaustively  the  conditions  of  existence.  The  thought  is  borne 
in  on  one  more  and  more  that  Spencer  has  a  right  to  be  regarded  as 
a  great  moralist,  as  one  of  the  greatest  ethical  teachers  of  his  gener- 
ation; and  this  may  probably  constitute  his  greatest  claim  to  future 
remembrance.  In  the  preface  to  the  "Data  of  Ethics"  he  says, 
"Written  as  far  back  as  1842  (Spencer  was  then  only  twenty-two 
years  old)  my  first  essay,  consisting  of  letters  on  'The  Proper  Sphere 
of  Government,'  vaguely  indicated  what  I  conceived  to  be  certain 
general  principles  of  right  and  wrong  in  political  conduct ;  and  from 
that  time  onward  my  ultimate  purpose,  lying  behind  all  proximate 
purposes,  has  been  that  of  finding  for  the  principles  of  right  and 
wrong,  in  conduct  at  large,  a  scientific  basis."  Could  language  be 
plainer  or  more  explicit?  From  the  very  beginning  of  his  intel- 
lectual activity  his  interest  lay  in  moral  questions,  and  his  "ultimate 
purpose,  lying  behind  all  proximate  purposes,"  was  to  find  for  the 
principles  of  right  and  wrong  in  the  whole  realm  of  conduct  "a 
scientific  basis."  This  fact,  I  repeat,  I  think  worthy  of  the  greatest 
emphasis,  and  consider  of  the  utmost  importance  in  a  true,  scien- 
tific evaluation  of  the  evolutionary  system  as  a  whole.  It  was  this 
part  of  the  task  to  which  he  regarded  "all  the  preceding  parts  as 
subsidiary."  The  evolutionary  system  as  a  whole,  I  take  it,  apart 
from  its  intrinsic  character,  its  own  special  propositions  and  form- 
ulations, is  to  be  viewed  and  judged,  also  in  the  light  of  its  end, 
and  to  have  its  special  character  stamped  and  marked  in  accordance 
with  that  judgment.  Only  thus,  it  seems  to  me,  does  one  reach  the 
highest  scientific  estimate,  or  arrive  at  a  due  philosophical  appre- 
ciation of  the  full  import  of  "evolutionism."  Surely  that  is  not  science 
which  neglects  any  of  the  factors,  and  only  the  stultification  and  abdi- 
cation of  science  which  neglects  one  of  the  highest  factors  of  all. 
And   it   shall   ever   remain   a   most  significant   fact  that  the   great 

1  "The  constituent  elements  of  an  organism  can  only  be  truly  and  ade- 
quately conceived  as  rendered  what  they  are  by  the  end  realized  through  the  or- 
ganism."   Green,  p.  83. 


12  EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS. 

founder  of  the  evolutionary  philosophy  was  led  to  his  colossal  work 
through  interest  in  ethical  questions. 

We  must  include  here  Spencer's  testimony  to  the  value  and 
need  of  morality.  "Few  things  can  happen  more  disastrous  than  the 
decay  and  death  of  a  regulative  system  no  longer  fit."  :  Spencer 
regarded  morality  as  of  supreme  worth.  The  dedication  of  his 
whole  life,  as  well  as — as  we  have  seen — of  his  whole  system,  in 
its  behalf,  in  its  scientific  establishment  and  philosophic  affirmation 
and  confirmation,  is  most  eloquent  proof  of  this,  and  constitutes,  at 
the  same  time,  one  of  the  most  inspiring  chapters  in  the  biography 
of  modern  heroism.  This  fact,  too,  is  to  be  taken  into  account  in 
our  judgment  and  full  final  evaluation  of  "evolutionism," — the  life 
and  character  of  its  leaders  and  exponents.2  The  worth  of  Science 
as  a  whole  is  judged,  and  rightly  judged,  by  its  effects  and  in- 
fluence upon  the  devotees  of  science,  upon  those  engaged  in  scien- 
tific investigations  and  labors,  theoretical  and  practical ; 3  and  in  the 
same  way  the  precise  and  complete  character  of  this  department  of 
scientific  thought,  this  division  of  scientific  ideas,  this  area  of  philo- 
sophy which  we  call  "Evolutionism,"  can  be  fully  determined  only  by 
a  knowledge  of  the  lives  and  characters  of  its  chief  promulgators 
and  illustrators.  Judged  in  the  light  of  Spencer's  life-long  devotion, 
in  spite  of  almost  constant  invalidism,  to  his  aims  (not  to  mention 
other  matters  such  as  his  probably  deliberately  chosen  celibacy,  sacri- 
fice of  a  worldly  career  that  would  no  doubt  have  been  as  prosperous 
as  brilliant),  Spencer's  labors  for  the  support  and  not  the  subversal 
or  undermining  4  of  morality  and  ethics,5  take  on  the  highest  char- 
acter and  positively  assume  the  proportions  of  the  grand  and  the 
heroic.8 

Spencer's  system,  broadly  characterized,  is  what  Martineau  calls 
Hedonistic  Utilitarian.  It  is  opposed  to  asceticism,  is  against  what  he 
terms  the  "impossible,"  against  "rules  that  cannot  be  obeyed."  He 
pleads  for  a  sane  and  scientific  morality,  in  accordance  with  the 
laws  of  life  and  the  essential  conditions  of  existence.     Spencer  rec- 

1  Data  of  Ethics,  preface. 

2  Cf.  Sidgwick,  H.  of  E.,  p.  31. 

3  Spencer's  Essay,   "What  Knowledge  Is  of  Most  Worth." 

4  As  in   Nietzsche  with   his   "Herren-Moral,"  regarding   ordinary   morality 
as  "Slave-Morality." 

5  Same  may  be  said  of  his  system's  final  effect  upon  religion.     See  Auto- 
biography, Vol.  IL,  p.  547. 

6  Crapsey  calls  Darwin  a  "saint."   (Religion  and  Politics,  p.  292). 


EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS. 


13 


ognizes  his  system's  "essential  likeness"  to  that- of  a  certain  class 
who  yet  criticise  his  own,  because  of  a  difference  of  derivation. 
"Ethical  principles  otherwise  derived  by  them,  coincide  with  ethical 
principles  scientifically  derived."1  The  difference,  he  insists,  is  one 
of  origin,  not  of  content.  He  resents  the  imputation  that  he  is  an 
"atheist"  if  he  diverges  from  "established  theological  dogma,"  and 
he  indignantly  repudiates  the  name  "materialist."  There  is  no  fund- 
amental antagonism,  he  maintains,  in  the  differences  that  exist  be- 
tween "natural  morality"  and  what  he  calls  "supernatural  morality." 
The  words  "secularization  of  morals,"-  in  my  opinion,  best 
describe  Spencer's  ethical  system.  Morality  is  not  destroyed  or 
invalidated,  as  it  is  in  the  systems  of  some  thinkers,  Nietzsche  for 
instance.  Spencer's  moral  rules  are  practically  those  of  the  current 
ethical  code.  He  speaks  of  their  having  a  "general  authority  to  be 
reverently  recognized."5  Justice,  kindness,  truth,  virtue,  chastity, 
duty,  peace,  perfection,  even  the  ideal,  are  cardinal  words  in  his 
system  also,  have  all  the  force  and  value  for  Spencer  that  they  have 
for  the  most  pronounced  traditional  moralist.  The  difference  is 
that  these  ideas  are  arrived  at  through  a  process  of  reasoning,  that 
is,  are  scientifically  deduced  and  philosophically  formulated  and 
validated.  "Their  dictates  have  to  be  interpreted  and  made  definite 
by  science."4  The  method  of  this  "analysis"  and  synthesis  and  con- 
sequent "secularization"  we  shall  now  proceed  to  show.  And,  first, 
let  us  examine  Spencer's  account  of  the  origin  of  the  moral  sense 
itself. 


PART  II. 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  MORAL  SENSE. 

Throughout  the  whole  of  human  conduct  there  are  necessary 
relations  of  cause  and  effect,  and  from  these  are  derived  all  moral 
rules,  however  much  these  may  be  proximately  derived  from  moral 
intuitions. " 

Spencer's  explanation  of  moral  intuitions  is  unique,  and  con- 

1  D.  of  E.,  preface. 
L'  Ibid. 

3  D.  of  E.,  sec.  63. 

4  Ibid. 

B  [bid,  sec.  20. 


I4  EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS. 

stitutes  a  positive  contribution  to  modern  thought  in  the 
reconciliation  of  the  views  of  the  empirical  psychologists  repre- 
sented by  Locke  and  those  of  the  older  intuitionists.  Spencer 
makes  original  use  of  the  Lamarckian  doctrine  of  "use-inheritance." 
In  a  letter  to  Mr.  Mill,  published  in  Bain's  "Mental  and  Moral 
Science,"  *  we  find  the  following  passages  : 

"Moral  intuitions  are  the  results  of  accumulated  experiences  of 
utility,  gradually  organized  and  inherited,"  and  "come  to  be  quite 
independent  of  conscious  experience."  .  .  .  "The  experiences  of 
utility,  organized  and  consolidated  through  all  past  experience  of 
the  human  race,  have  been  producing  nervous  modifications  which 
by  continued  transmission  and  accumulation,  have  become  in  us 
certain  faculties  of  moral  intuition,  certain  emotions  corresponding 
to  right  and  wrong  conduct,  which  have  no  apparent  basis  in  the 
individual  experience  of  utility." 

To  the  above,  Spencer  added  in  the  "Data  of  Ethics,"  2 — "The 
evolution-hypothesis  thus  enables  us  to  reconcile  opposed  theories  of 
knowledge.  For,  as  the  doctrine  of  innate  forms  of  intellectual 
intuition  falls  into  harmony  with  the  experimental  doctrine,  when 
we  recognize  the  production  of  intellectual  faculties  by  inheritance 
of  effects  wrought  by  experience;  so  the  doctrine  of  innate  powers 
of  moral  perception  becomes  congruous  with  the  utilitarian  doctrine, 
when  it  is  seen  that  preferences  and  aversions  are  rendered  organic 
by  inheritance  of  the  effects  of  pleasurable  and  painful  experiences  in 
progenitors."3 

These  intuitions  are  the  slowly-organized  results  of  experiences 
received  by  the  race  while  living  in  the  presence  of  the  conditions  to 
the  achievement  of  the  highest  life.4 

The  origin  of  moral  obligation  is  the  sentiment  of  duty  in  gen- 
eral, which  latter  is  an  abstract  sentiment  generated  in  a  manner 
analogous  to  that  in  which  abstract  ideas  are  generated.5 

Accumulated  experiences  have  produced  the  consciousness  that 
guidance  of  feelings  which  refer  to  remote  and  general  results  is 
usually  more  conducive  to  welfare  than  guidance  by  feelings  to 
be  immediately  gratified.6    The  common  character  of  feelings  that 

1  Third   edition,   p.   721. 

2  Sec.  46. 

3  Cf.  Fiske.    O.  of  C.  P.,  Vol.  II.,  Chapter  XXII. 

4  D.  of  E.,  Sec.  63. 

5  D.  of  E.,  Sec.  47. 

6  Ibid. 


EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS.  ,5 

prompt  honesty,  truthfulness,  diligence,  providence,  etc.,  which  men 
find  to  be  better  prompters  than  the  appetites  and  simple  impulses, 
is  that  they  are  all  complex,  re-representative  feelings,  occupied 
with  the  future  rather  than  the  present.  Therefore,  the  idea  of 
authoritativeness  comes  to  be  connected  with  feelings  having  these 
traits,  and  this  idea  of  authoritativeness  is  one  element  in  the  ab- 
stract consciousness  of  duty.1 

Another  element  is  co-erciveness.  This  originates  from  the  ex- 
perience of  political,  religious,  and  social  restraints  that  have  estab- 
lished themselves  in  the  course  of  civilization. 

In  Spencer's  account  of  the  political,  religious  and  social  re- 
straints lies  the  core  of  his  teaching  with  regard  to  the  origin  of  the 
moral  consciousness.     His  theory  is  as  follows: 

The  essential  trait  in  the  moral  consciousness  is  the  control  of 
some  feeling  or  feelings  by  some  other  feeling  or  feelings.  As  social 
evolution  renders  the  life  more  complex,  the  restraints  many  and 
strong,  the  evils  of  impulsive  conduct  marked,  and  the  comforts  to 
be  gained  by  providing  for  the  future  tolerably  certain,  there  come 
experiences  numerous  enough  to  make  familiar  the  benefits  of 
subordinating  the  simpler  feelings  to  the  more  complex  ones. 

There  also  arises  sufficient  intellectual  power  to  make  an  induc- 
tion from  these  experiences,  followed  by  a  sufficient  massing  of 
individual  induction  into  a  public  and  traditional  induction  im- 
pressed on  each  generation. 

This  conscious  relinquishment  of  immediate  and  special  good 
to  gain  distant  and  general  good  is  a  cardinal  trait  of  the  (1)  self- 
restraint  called  moral;  it  is  also  a  cardinal  trait  of  the  self-restraint 
originating  from  (2)  fear  of  visible  ruler  (political),  (3)  fear  of 
invisible  ruler  (religious),  and  (4)  fear  of  society  at  large  (social.) 

These  four  are  at  first  practically  co-extensive  and  undistin- 
guished ;  yet  in  the  course  of  social  evolution  they  differentiate  and 
eventually  the  moral  control  with  its  accompanying  conceptions  and 
sentiments  emerges  independent.    The  process  is  as  follows : 

In  rudest  groups,  neither  political  nor  religious  rule  exists. 
The  leading  check  to  immediate  satisfaction  of  each  desire  as  it 
arises,  is  the  consciousness  of  the  evils  which  the  anger  of  fellow- 
savages  may  entail.    First  there  is  only  mutual  dread  of  vengeance. 

1  D.  of  E.,  Sec.  47. 


16  EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS. 

Gradually,  the  fear  of  the  angry  chief  becomes  distinguishable,  i.  e., 
political  control  begins  to  differentiate.  Meanwhile  has  been  de- 
veloping the  ghost  theory,  fear  of  the  double  of  the  deceasd  man, 
which  becomes  later  fear  of  the  ghosts  of  dead  chiefs,  which  gives 
rise  to  the  religious  restraint.  For  a  long  time  these  three  sets  of 
restraint  are  co-extensive  because  they  mostly  refer  to  one  end — 
success  in  war.  Killing  of  enemies  becomes  both  a  political  and  a 
religious  duty.  The  control  of  social  opinion  is  directly  exercised 
by  praise  of  the  brave  and  blame  of  the  cowardly  and  comes  to  be 
indirectly  exercised  by  applause  of  loyalty  to  ruler  and  piety  to  the 
god. 

The  growth  of  political  authority  gradually  checks  the  taking 
of  personal  satisfaction  for  injuries.  The  fact  that  success  in  war 
is  endangered  if  followers  fight  among  themselves  is  a  strong  motive 
for  rulers  for  restraining  quarrels;  therefore,  he  forbids  aggression 
and  inflicts  punishment  for  disobedience.  Political  restraints  are 
enforced  by  religious  restraints.  Dread  of  the  ghost  of  the  dead  ruler 
produces  regard  for  traditional  commands,  which  eventually  acquire 
sacredness.  With  further  social  evolution  come  further  interdicts, 
until  eventually  arises  a  body  of  civil  laws;  religious  injunctions 
harmonize  with  and  enforce  the  political  injunctions;  while  simul- 
taneously there  develops  a  social  sanction  for  these  rules  of  internal 
conduct,  strengthening  the  political  and  religious  sanctions. 

Yet  the  P.  R.  and  S.1  controls,  which  are  like  the  moral  control 
in  habitually  requiring  subjection  of  simple  presentative  feelings  to 
complex,  representative  feelings  and  postponement  of  present  to 
future,  do  not  constitute  the  moral  control,  but  are  only  preparatory 
to  it.     From  them  the  moral  control  evolves. 

The  command  of  the  political  ruler  is  first  obeyed  because  it  is 
his  command,  not  from  a  representation  of  evil  consequences.  The 
sinfulness  of  breaking  divine  injunction  lies  first  in  the  disobedience 
to  God,  not  in  the  entailing  of  injury.  Breach  of  social  rules  is  con- 
demned as  ignoring  the  world's  authority,  not  as  being  any  essential 
impropriety. 

The  essential  truths  to  be  noted  are  (lst)  P.  R.  and  S.  controls 
have  evolved  with  the  evolution  of  society  as  means  to  social  self- 
preservation,  necessary  and  mutually  congruous.     (2nd)     The  cor- 

1  We  shall  use  these  initials  for  the  words  Political,  Religious  and  Social. 


EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS.  I? 

relative  internal  restraints  are  representations  of  remote  results 
which  are  incidental  rather  than  necessary — a  legal  penalty,  a  super- 
natural punishment,  a  social  reprobation.  (3rd)  These  results  are 
simple  and  more  directly  wrought  and,  therefore,  more  vividly  con- 
ceived than  natural  results  of  action,  therefore  more  potent  over 
undeveloped  minds.  (4th)  The  thought  of  external  co-ercion  being 
always  joined,  there  arises  the  notion  of  obligation,  which  so  be- 
comes habitually  associated  with  surrender  of  immediate  special 
benefits,  for  the  sake  of  distant,  general  benefits.  (5th)  The  moral 
control  corresponds  in  a  large  measure  with  the  P.  R.  and  S.  in 
respect  of  its  injunctions,  and  the  nature  of  the  mental  processes 
producing  conformity  to  these  injunctions,  but  differs  in  their  special 
nature. 

For  the  restraints  properly  distinguished  as  moral  are  unlike 
these  restraints  out  of  which  they  evolve  and  with  which  they  are 
long  confounded,  in  this — they  refer,  not  to  extrinsic  effects  of 
actions,  but  to  their  intrinsic  effects.1  The  moral  motive  differs  from 
the  motive  with  which  it  is  associated,  in  this — that  instead  of  being 
constituted  by  representation  of  incidental,  collateral,  non-necessary 
consequences  of  acts,  it  is  constituted  by  representations  of  conse- 
quences which  the  acts  naturally  produce. 

Therefore,  moral  feelings  are  later  than  the  P.  R.  and  S.,  for 
only  from  these  lower  evolve  the  higher.  Only  after  P.  R.  and  S. 
restraints  have  produced  a  stable  community  can  there  be  sufficient 
experience  of  the  pain  which  comes  of  aggression,  to  cause  us  to 
generate  that  moral  aversion  constituted  by  the  consciousness  of  their 
intrinsically  evil  results. 

We  associate  the  name  "moral"  with  feelings  that  are  firstly, 
re-representative ;  secondly,  concerned  with  indirect  rather  than  direct 
effects  and  generally  with  remote  rather  than  immediate ;  and  thirdly, 
that  refer  to  effects  mostly  general  rather  than  special.2 

The  above  is  Spencer's  famous  account  of  the  origin  of  the 
moral  sentiment. 

Spencer  alludes  to  Dr.  Bain's  ascribing  the  feeling  of  moral 
obligation  as  due  to  the  effects  of  punishment  inflicted  by  law  and 
public  opinion,  and  agrees  with  him  to  the  extent  of  thinking  that 

1  D.  of  E.,  Sec.  46. 
2.  D.  of  E.,  Sec.  45  ff. 


18  EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS. 

by  them  is  generated  the  sense  of  compulsion  which  the  conscious- 
ness of  duty  includes,  and  which  the  word  "obligation"  indicates. 
He  calls  attention,  however,  to  an  earlier  and  deeper  element,  gen- 
erated as  above  described,  implied  by  the  fact  that  certain  of  the 
higher  self-regarding  feelings  (prudence,  economy)  have  a  moral 
authority  in  opposition  to  the  simpler  self-regarding  feelings,  show- 
ing that  apart  from  any  thought  of  factitious  penalties,  the  feeling 
constituted  by  representation  of  the  natural  penalties  has  acquired 
an  acknowledged  superiority. 

Fears  of  political  and  social  penalties  (and  perhaps  religious) 
have  generated  that  sense  of  co-erciveness  which  goes  along  with  the 
thought  of  postponing  present  and  future  to  the  personal  desires  and 
claims  of  others.  This  sense  of  co-erciveness  becomes  indirectly  con- 
nected with  the  feelings  distinguished  as  moral. 

"For  since  the  P.  R.  and  S.  restraining  motives  are  mainly 
formed  of  represented  future  results  and  since  the  moral  restraining 
motive  is  mainly  formed  of  represented  future  results,  it  happens 
that  the  representations,  having  much  in  common,  and  being  often 
aroused  at  the  same  time,  the  fear  joined  with  three  sets  of  them 
becomes,  by  association,  joined  with  the  forth.  Thinking  of  the 
extrinsic  effects  of  a  forbidden  act,  excites  a  dread  which  continues 
present  while  the  intrinsic  effects  of  the  act  are  thought  of;  and 
being  thus  linked  to  these  intrinsic  effects  causes  a  vague  sense  of 
moral  compulsion"  l 

With  this  ingenious  account  of  the  rise  of  the  moral  sentiment 
is  joined  the  startling  conclusion  that  the  sense  of  duty  or  moral 
obligation  is  transitory  and  will  diminish  as  fast  as  moralization  in- 
creases. As  the  moral  motive  becomes  distinct  and  predominant  it 
loses  the  associated  consciousness  as  above  described  and  the  feeling 
of  obligation  fades. 

"With  complete  adaption  to  the  social  state  that  element  in 
the  moral  consciousness  which  is  expressed  by  the  word  "obligation" 
will  disappear.  The  highest  actions  required  for  the  harmonious 
carrying  on  of  life  will  be  as  much  a  matter  of  course  as  are  these 
lower  actions  which  the  simple  desires  prompt.  In  their  proper 
times  and  places  and  proportions,  the  moral  sentiments  will  guide 
men  just  as  spontaneously  and  adequately  as  now  do  the  sensa- 
tions." 2 

1  D.  of  EM  Sec.  47. 

2  Ibid. 


EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS.  Ig 

In  other  words,  it  will  be  just  as  natural  and  agreeable  to  do 
right,  as  for  a  person  of  healthy  appetite  to  eat.  "The  pleasures 
and  pains  which  the  moral  sentiments  originate  will,  like  bodily 
pleasures  and  pains,  become  incentives  and  deterrents  so  adjusted  in 
their  strength  to  the  needs  that  the  moral  conduct  will  be  the  nat- 
ural conduct."1 


PART  III. 


SPENCERS  UTILITARIANISM. 

It  is  sufficiently  plain  from  the  account  that  has  already  been 
given  that  Spencer  is  a  Utilitarian.  His  system  is  Hedonistic  Util- 
itarianism. In  the  above  analysis  the  moral  intuitions  are  explained 
as  the  result  of  accumulated  experiences  of  utility.  Utilitarian  con- 
siderations are  at  the  basis  of  Spencer's  whole  system.  Spencer  ex- 
plicitly avows  himself  as  of  that  school.  Because  of  his  criticism, 
in  "Social  Statics,"  of  the  empirical  utilitarianism  of  Bentham,  he 
was  accused  by  Mill  of  being  an  anti-utilitarian ;  in  a  letter  to  Mill, 
published  in  Bain's  "Mental  and  Moral  Science,"2  he  denies  this  in 
the  following  language.  "I  have  never  regarded  myself  as  an  anti- 
utilitarian.  My  dissent  from  the  doctrine  of  utility  as  commonly 
understood,  concerns  not  the  object  to  be  reached  by  men  but  the 
method  of  reaching  it.  While  I  admit  that  happiness  is  the  ultimate 
end  to  be  contemplated,  I  do  not  admit  that  it  should  be  the  proxi- 
mate end.  The  expediency-philosophy  having  concluded  that  hap- 
piness is  a  thing  to  be  achieved,  assumes  that  morality  has  no  other 
business  than  empirically  to  generalize  the  results  of  conduct  and 
to  supply  for  the  guidance  of  conduct  nothing  more  than  its  em- 
pirical generalizations." 

"But  the  view  for  which  I  contend  is  that  Morality  properly 
co-called — the  science  of  right  conduct — has  for  its  object  to  deter- 
mine how  and  why  certain  modes  of  conduct  are  detrimental,  and 
certain  other  modes  beneficial.  These  good  and  bad  results  cannot 
be  accidental,  but  must  be  necessary  consequences  of  the  constitution 
of  things:  and  I  conceive  it  to  be  the  business  of  Moral  Science  to 
deduce  from  the  laws  of  life  and  the  conditions  of  existence,  what 
kinds   of  action   necessarily  tend  to  produce   happiness   and  what 

1  D.  of  E.,  Sec.  48. 

2  P.  307.    Quoted  in  part  in  the  Data  of  Ethics. 


20  EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS. 

kinds  to  produce  unhappiness.  Having  done  this,  its  deductions 
are  to  be  recognized  as  laws  of  conduct;  and  are  to  be  conformed  to 
irrespective  of  a  direct  estimation  of  happiness  or  misery." 

In  the  above,  the  laws  of  conduct  are  to  be  deduced  from  the 
tendency  of  actions,  ultimately  if  not  proximately,  to  produce  hap- 
piness. Spencer  elsewhere  says  explicitly,  "Analysing  the  conditions 
of  complete  living  necessitates  the  recognition  of  happiness  for  each 
and  all  as  the  end  to  be  achieved  by  fulfilment  of  these  conditions."  r 
"The  ultimate  supreme  end"  is  "Happiness  special  and  general." 
"Right  and  wrong  as  conceived  by  us  can  exist  only  in  relation  to 
the  actions  of  creatures  capable  of  pleasures  and  pains."  2 

Conduct  is  good  or  bad,  according  to  Spencer,  according  as  the 
total  effects  are  pleasurable  or  painful.  "The  good  is  invariably 
the  pleasurable."  "Pleasure  somewhere,  at  sometime,  to  some  being 
or  beings,  is  an  inexpugnable  element  of  the  conception  of  moral 
aim."  3  "No  school  can  avoid  taking  for  the  ultimate  moral  aim  a 
desirable  state  of  feeling,  called  by  whatever  name — gratification, 
enjoyment,  happiness." 

Life  is  good  or  bad  according  as  it  does  or  does  not  leave  a  sur- 
plus of  agreeable  feeling.  "We  regard  as  good  the  conduct  further- 
ing self-preservation  and  as  bad  the  conduct  tending  to  self-destruc- 
tion." The  establishment  of  an  associated  state  both  makes  possible 
and  requires  a  form  of  conduct  such  that  life  may  be  completed  in 
each  and  his  offspring,  not  only  without  preventing  completion  of 
it  in  others,  but  with  furtherance  of  it  in  others.  The  aim  of  mor- 
ality is  life,  of  absolute  morality  is  complete  life.4"  Ethics  is  the 
"laws  of  right  living  at  large."  Beyond  the  conduct  commonly  ap- 
proved or  reprobated  as  right  or  wrong  it  includes  all  conduct  which 
furthers  or  hinders,  directly  or  indirectly,  the  welfare  of  self  and 
others. 5  The  conduct  called  good  rises  to  the  conduct  conceived  as 
best,  when  it  fulfills  all  three  classes  of  ends  at  the  same  time — 
"greatest  totality  of  life  in  self,  in  offspring,  and  in  fellow-man." 

It  is  quite  consistent  to  assert  that  happiness  is  the  ultimate 
aim  of  action  and  at  the  same  time  to  deny  that  it  can  be  reached 
by  making  it  the  immediate  aim.  What  constitutes  happiness  is 
more  difficult  to  determine  than  what  constitutes  the  means  of  its 

1  D.  of  E.,  See.  63. 

2  Ibid,  Sec.  100. 

3  Ibid,  See.  16. 

4  Essay  on  Prison  Ethics  (Essays,  p.  269). 

5  D.  of  E.,  Sec.  109. 


EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS.  21 

attainment.  Since  evolution  has  been  and  still  is  working  towards 
the  highest  life,  it  follows  "that  conformity  to  those  principles  by 
which  the  highest  life  is  achieved  is  furtherance  of  that  end." 

That  happiness  is  the  supreme  end  is  beyond  question  true,  for 
it  is  the  concomitant  of  that  highest  life  which  every  theory  of 
moral  guidance  has  distinctly  or  vaguely  in  view.1  Those  ethical 
systems  which  make  virtue,  right,  obligation,  the  cardinal  aims  are 
complementary  to  those  which  make  welfare,  happiness,  pleasure, 
the  cardinal  aim. 

General  happiness  is  to  be  achieved  mainly  through  the  adequate 
pursuit  of  their  own  happiness  by  individuals  ;  while,  reciprocally,  the 
happiness  of  individuals  is  to  be  achieved,  in  part,  by  their  pursuit 
of  the  general  happiness. 

When  conditions  require  any  class  of  actions  to  be  relatively 
great,  there  will  arise  relatively  great  pleasure  accompanying  that 
class  of  activities. 

All  conduct  is  acts  adjusted  to  ends.  Our  use  of  the  words 
good  or  bad  with  respect  to  conduct  under  its  ethical  aspect,  has 
regard  to  the  efficiency  or  nonmefficiency  of  adjustments  of  acts  to 
ends.  Always  those  acts  are  good  or  bad  according  as  they  are  well 
or  ill-adapted  to  ends.  All  the  actions  conducive  to  self-welfare  and 
the  welfare  of  the  species  will  be  pleasurable.2 


PART  IV. 

JUSTICE. 

In  the  foregoing  we  have  seen  that,  according  to  Spencer,  hap- 
piness is  the  end  of  life.  This  idea  is  repeated  with  unwearied  em- 
phasis in  all  his  work.  Whether  called,  as  in  "Social  Statics,"  "the 
Divine  idea,"  regarded  as  the  will  and  purpose  of  God,  or  divested, 
as  it  was  later,  of  all  theological  or  theistic  implications,3  happiness, 
individual  and  social,  happiness  in  the  greatest  possible  degree,  re- 
mained for  Spencer  the  supreme  end  of  all  life  and  all  evolutionary 
development.  In  this  sense,  Spencer  was  indeed  a  hedonist  of  the 
most  pronounced  type. 

But  how   is   happiness,   the  end   of  life,  to  Be   attained^     In 

1  [bid,  Bee  63. 

2  Negative  and   Positive  Beneficence,   p.   331. 

3  See  note  d  on  answer  to  Sidgwick,  Soc.  Stat.,  p.  90. 


22  EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS. 

Spencer's  first  ethical  work,  "Social  Statics,"  this  matter  was  already 
fully  discussed  and  philosophically  developed. 

Happiness  consists  in  gratification,  which  depends  upon  due  ex- 
ercise of  the  faculties.  The  latter  implies  freedom,  for  it  is  only 
as  men  are  free  that  they  can  exercise  their  several  faculties.  Free- 
dom is  thus  the  primary  condition.  But  since  all  have  a  right  to 
happiness,  it  follows  that  the  freedom  of  each  must  be  compatible 
with  the  freedom  of  all  the  rest.  The  spheres  of  activity  must  not 
intrench  upon  one  another.  Consequently  the  liberty  of  each  must 
be  limited,  but  limited  only  by  the  like  liberty  of  all.  From  this 
condition  arises  what  is  called  justice,  variously  defined  by  Spencer, 
but  essentially  the  same  in  the  possession  of  this  common  character- 
istic of  the  recognition  of  the  sphere  of  each  bounded  only  by  the 
like  or  similar  sphere  of  all.1  In  that  volume  of  the  Ethics  which 
bears  the  name  of  "Justice"  2  it  is  frequently  termed  "mutual  re- 
straint," though  more  fully  described  in  the  sentence, — which  ap- 
plies as  a  rule,  without  qualification,  in  both  human  and  sub-human 
life —  "Each  individual  ought  to  be  subject  to  the  effects  of  its  own 
nature  and  resulting  conduct."  In  the  ratio  between  conduct  and 
consequence  lies  justice.  The  treatment  here  is  somewhat  different 
than  in  his  earlier  works,  but  here,  too,  the  "formula  of  justice"  is 
"Every  man  is  free  to  do  that  which  he  wills,  provided  he  infringes 
not  the  equal  freedom  of  any  other  man."  3  In  "Social  Statics"  this  is 
expressed  in  virtually  identical  language.4  Justice  is  equalness, — 
hence  the  word  equity;  and  it  is  a  source  of  considerable  pride  to 
Spencer,  that  in  this  mental  admeasurement  of  moral  quantities,  his 
system  approaches  so  nearly  to  the  geometrical,  and  in  its  synthetic 
development,  "partakes  of  the  character  of  an  exact  science."  5  For 
Spencer  applies  this  principle  of  "equalness"  to  the  whole  range  of 
human  affairs.  He  distinguishes  between  equality  and  inequality, 
as  applied,  the  one  to  the  "bounds,"  the  other  to  the  "benefits" — i.  e. 
"The  equality  concerns  the  mutually  limited  sphere  of  action  which 
must  be  maintained  if  associated  men  are  to  co-operate  harmoniously. 
The  inequality  concerns  the  results  which  each  may  achieve  by  car- 
rying on  his  actions  within  the  implied  limits.6     Whereas  unequal 

1  Cf.  the  definition  of  justice  in  the  Pandects  as  "Perpetua  voluntas  suum 
cuique." 

2  Part  IV.  of  the  Morals,  published  in  advance  of  Pts.  II.  and  III.,  1891. 

3  Justice,  p.  46. 

4  Soc.  Stat.,  p.  121. 

5  Ibid,  p.  501. 

6  Justice,  p.  43. 


EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS.  23 

benefits  must  result  since,  according  to  the  law  of  justice  each  is  to 
take  the  consequences  of  his  own  nature  which  is  different  in  each, 
the  limits  in  which  man  may  exercise  his  own  powers  must  be 
kept  open  and  uninterfered  with  except  as  restricted  by  the  equal 
claims  of  others."  This  teaching  of  justice  is  basic  and  central  to 
the  whole  system  of  evolutionary  moral  philosophy.  Spencer  calls 
it  "the  supreme  moral  law."  '  He  speaks  everywhere  of  its  funda- 
mental radical  importance.  It  is  the  primary  principle  of  conduct. 
From  it,  as  corollaries,  are  deduced  all  the  moral  rules  and  the 
ethical  injunctions  of  society.  The  sacredness  of  life,  the  inviola- 
bility of  person,  of  property,  of  reputation,  all  the  rights  of  individ- 
uals, and  the  rules  embodying  these  rights  and  prohibiting  their 
transgression  are  derived  from  this  fundamental  principle  of  justice. 
"Justice  we  hold  to  be  higher  generosity,"  writes  Spencer.2  "The 
motive  causing  a  generous  act  has  reference  to  effects  of  a  more  con- 
crete, special  and  proximate  kind  than  the  motive  to  do  justice  which 
beyond  the  proximate  effects,  usually  themselves  less  concrete  than 
those  that  generosity  contemplates,  includes  a  consciousness  of  the 
distant,  involved,  diffused  effects  of  maintaining  equitable  relations."3 
The  practical  part  of  Spencer's  teaching  of  justice  is  against  social- 
ism and  communism  and  every  kind  of  paternalism.  He  opposes 
state-interference  of  every  sort  and  holds  that  the  proper  function 
of  government  is  precisely  this  of  maintaining  justice.  Spencer  is 
an  advocate  of  the  most  extreme  individualism.  With  Coleridge  he 
believes  the  true  idea  of  life  to  be  "the  tendency  to  individuation." 
This  is  highest  in  the  moral  sphere.  "What  we  call  the  moral  law — 
the  law  of  equal  freedom — is  the  law  under  which  individuation 
becomes  perfect;  and  ability  to  recognize  and  act  up  to  this  law  is 
the  final  endowment  of  humanity."  4  "Only  by  entire  fulfilment  of 
the  moral  law  can  life  become  complete ;  and,  all  life  whatever  may 
be  denned  as  a  quality,  of  which  aptitude  to  fulfill  this  law  is  the 
highest  manifestation."  5 

"Such  a  moral  sentiment  as  abstract  justice,"  writes  Spencer,6 
"which  is  offended  not  only  by  material  injuries  done  to  men,  but 
also  by  political  arrangments  that  place  them  at  a  disadvantage, 
can  evolve  only  after  the  social  stage  reached  gives  familiar  expe- 

1  Justice,  p.  155. 

2  D.  of  E.,  Sec.  46. 

3  Ibid. 

4  Soc.  Stat.,  p.  481. 

5  Ibid,  p.  476. 

6  D.  of  E.,  Sec.  46. 


24  EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS. 

rience,  both  of  the  pains  flowing  directly  from  injustices,  and  also 
of  those  flowing  indirectly  from  the  class  privileges  which  make 
injustices  easy." 

The  sentiment  of  justice  Spencer  regards  "as  nothing  but  a  sym- 
pathetic affection  of  the  instinct  of  personal  rights, — a  sort  of  re- 
flex function  of  it."  x  Applying  and  extending  to  his  own  doctrine 
of  a  Moral  Sense  Adam  Smith's  famous  doctrine  of  Sympathy,  as 
found  in  his  "Theory  of  the  Moral  Sentiments,"  as  "a  faculty  whose 
function  it  is  to  excite  in  each  being  the  emotion  displayed  by  sur- 
rounding ones,  a  faculty  which  awakens  a  fellow  feeling  with  the 
passions  of  others,"  Spencer  reaches  the  conclusion  that  "justice  and 
beneficence"  (as  already  previously  hinted),2  "have  a  common  root."  3 
"All  the  actions  properly  classed  under  the  one,  and  which  we  de- 
scribe as  fair,  equitable,  upright,  spring  from  the  sympathetic  ex- 
citement of  the  instinct  of  personal  rights;  whilst  those  usually 
grouped  under  the  other  as  mercy,  charity,  good-nature,  generosity, 
amiability,  considerateness,  are  due  to  the  action  of  Sympathy  upon 
one  or  more  of  the  other  feelings." 

Spencer  ridicules  Bentham's  derivation  of  the  sense  of  justice 
from  the  idea  of  benefits.  To  assert  that  the  sense  of  justice  arises 
from  a  conviction  of  benefit  is  as  absurd  as  to  "conclude  that  hunger 
springs  from  a  conviction  of  the  benefit  of  eating,  or  that  love  of 
offspring  is  a  result  of  the  wish  to  maintain  the  species !"  * 

In  the  "Data  of  Ethics"  Spencer  furnishes  us  with  a  "physical 
analogy"  of  this  "cardinal  truth"  of  justice.  He  shows  how,  in  any 
mass  of  matter,  to  preserve  internal  equilibrium  throughout  the 
mass  of  molecules,  the  mutual  limitations  of  their  activities  must 
be  everywhere  alike.5  To  social  equilibrium  there  is  the  same  pre- 
requisite which  must  be  fulfilled  before  complete  life,  i.  e.,  greatest 
happiness,  can  be  attained  in  any  society.  "Maintenance  of  equitable 
relations  between  men  is  the  condition  to  attainment  of  greatest  hap- 
piness in  all  societies,  however  much  the  greatest  happiness  attain- 
able in  each  may  differ  in  nature  or  amount,  or  both."  6 

Thus  though  happiness  is  the  great  end  of  individuals  and  of 
societies,  it  can  be  attained  only  in  one  way,  viz.,  through  justice, 
the  observance  and  maintenance  of  equitable  relations. 

1  Soc.  Stat.,  p.  116. 

2  Ibid,  p.  86. 

3  Ibid,  p.  116. 

4  Ibid,  p.  111. 

5  Ibid,   p.  197. 

6  Ibid,  p.  198. 


EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS.  25 

PART  V. 


NEGATIVE    AND    POSITIVE 
BENEFICENCE. 

In  the  preface  to  Vol.  I  of  the  "Principles  of  Ethics,"  Spencer 
is  led  to  remark  that  he  is  especially  anxious  to  write  the  sections 
on  Negative  and  Positive  Beneficence  x  because,  in  the  absence  of 
them,  the  divisions  at  present  published  will  leave,  in  nearly  all 
minds,  a  very  'erroneous  impression  respecting  the  general  tone  of 
Evolutionary  Ethics.  "In  its  full  scope,  the  moral  system  to  be  set 
forth  unites  sternness  with  kindness;  but  thus  far  attention  has  been 
drawn  almost  wholly  to  the  sternness."  Extreme  missapprehension 
and  gross  misstatement,  he  declares,  have  hence  resulted. 

A  gap  remains  to  be  filled  up,  "  a  further  advance  not  yet  even 
hinted."  "For  beyond  so  behaving  that  each  achieves  his  ends  with- 
out preventing  others  from  achieving  their  ends,  the  members  of  a 
society  may  give  mutual  help  in  the  achievement  of  ends."  2  Evo- 
lutionary ethics  are  not  complete  without  an  account  of  Negative 
and  Positive  Beneficence.  Here,  as  in  other,  regarded  probably 
as  higher,  systems  the  cap-stone  is  what  commonly  passes  under  the 
name  of  love.  Love  is  the  fulfilment  of  the  evolutionary  law.  "If, 
either  indirectly  by  individual  co-operation  or  directly  by  volunteered 
aid,  fellow-citizens  can  make  easier  for  one  another  the  adjustments 
of  acts  to  ends,  then  their  conduct  assumes  a  still  higher  phase  of 
evolution:  since  whatever  facilitates  the  making  of  adjustments  by 
each,  increases  the  totality  of  the  adjustments  made,  and  serves  to 
render  the  lives  of  all  more  complete."  3 

While  recognizing  the  fundamental  character  of  justice  as  a 
rule  of  conduct  and  a  means  of  happiness,  Spencer  also  accords  due 
place  to  the  "supplementary"  virtue  of  beneficence.  Beneficence  is  a 
sympathetic  recognition  of  others'  claims  to  receive  aid  in  the  ob- 
tainment  of  products  and  in  the  effective  carrying  on  of  their  lives. 
The  highest  form  of  life,  individual  and  social,  is  not  achievable 
nor  is  the  fullest  measure  of  happiness  obtained  under  a  reign  of 
justice  only;  but  there  must  be  joined  with  it  a  reign  of  beneficence. 
We  may  compare  with  this  the  statement  in  the  "Data  of  Ethics"  4 

1  Published   afterwards   as    I'ts.    V.    aud    VI.    (1803).  

2  D.  of  E..  Bee.  a  ^^^Z7^T^> 
8  Ibid.                                                                                                       /*0<*X!*V 

4  Ibid,  Sec  :>\.  /    V*  Qf  T"r-      _w 

V   ... 


26  EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS. 

that  "the  limit  of  evolution  of  conduct  is  not  reached  until  beyond 
avoidance  of  direct  and  indirect  injuries  to  others,  there  are  spontane- 
ous efforts  to  further  the  welfare  of  others."  The  cup  of  happiness  is 
not  full  to  the  brim  until  in  addition  to  the  happiness  arising  from 
non-interference  by  others  is  added  the  happiness  through  their  po- 
sitive and  direct  efforts.  The  first  is  Negative,  the  second  is  Positive, 
Beneficence. 

"The  requirements  of  equity  must  be  supplemented  by  the 
promptings  of  kindness."  1  "Daily  experiences  prove  that  every  one 
would  suffer  many  evils  and  lose  many  goods,  did  none  give  him  un- 
paid assistance."  2  Furthering  the  happiness  of  others,  Spencer  calls 
positive  beneficence.  "The  highest  life"  is  reached  "only  when,  besides 
helping  to  complete  one  another's  lives  by  specified  reciprocities  of 
aid,  men  otherwise  help  to  complete  one  another's  lives."  3  "The  social 
man  has  not  reached  that  harmonization  of  constitution  with  con- 
ditions forming  the  limit  of  evolution,  so  long  as  there  remains 
space  for  the  growth  of  faculties  which,  by  their  exercise,  bring 
positive  benefits  to  others  and  satisfaction  to  self.''4  Recognizing 
the  limits  set  to  each  by  the  presence  of  others  and  not  infringing 
on  the  latter's  rights  is  Negative  Beneficence.  But  "if  the  presence 
of  fellow-men,  while  putting  certain  limits  to  each  man's  sphere 
of  activity,  opens  certain  other  spheres  of  activity,  in  which  feelings, 
while  achieving  their  gratification,  do  not  diminish  but  add  to  the 
gratification  of  others,  then  such  spheres  will  inevitably  b*  occu- 
pied." 5  In  this  way  Spencer  makes  room  for  the  exercise  of  kind- 
ness which  is  included  under  the  name  of  positive  beneficence.  Thus 
kindness,  mercy,  love  are  words  spoken  also  by  evolution  although, 
as  Spencer  remarks  rather  regretfully  and  with  confessed  disap- 
pointment, not  so  directly  derived  from  evolutionary  principles  as 
he  had  hoped.6  "Altruism,"  he  holds,  "is  no  less  primordial  than 
self-preservation,"  7  and  altruistic  actions  include  both  justice  and 
beneficence,  the  root  of  both  of  which  is  sympathy.8  The  enforce- 
ment of  justice  Spencer  regards  as  a  public  function,  while  the  ex- 
ercise of  beneficence  must  be  a  private  function.9     When  directed 

1  Neg.  and  Pos.  B.,  p.  270. 

2  D.  of  E.,  Sec.  55. 

3  Ibid,  Sec.  56. 

4  Ibid,  Sec.  55. 

5  Ibid,  Sec.  55. 

6  N.  and  P.  B.,  preface. 

7  D.  of  E.,  Sec.  76. 

8  N.  and  P.  B.,  p.  268. 

9  Ibid,  p.  271. 


EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS.  27 

towards  the  poor  it  is  called  benevolence.1  Beneficence  should  be 
spontaneous.  Beneficence  when  strained  ceases  to  be  beneficence.2  In 
general,  parental  conduct  exemplifies  beneficence  more  than  any 
other  conduct.3  But  "after  the  conduct  which  is  of  individual  con- 
cern only  and  affects  others  in  but  remote  ways,  if  at  all,  and  after 
the  conduct  comprehended  under  the  head  of  justice,  which  sets 
forth  restrains  on  individual  life  imposed  by  social  life;  nearly  all 
the  remainder  of  conduct  becomes  the  subject  matter  of  beneficence, 
negative  and  positive.  For  nearly  all  this  remainder  of  conduct, 
pleasurably  or  painfully  affects  others  from  hour  to  hour."  4 

The  largest  field,  then,  according  to  Spencer,  remains  for  the 
exercise  of  the  altruistic  sentiments. 

The  "chief  temporary  function"  is  for  beneficence  to  mitigate 
the  sufferings  caused  by  the  transition  from  the  present,  imperfect, 
militant-industrial  state  (with  its  ethics  of  enmity)  to  the  future 
perfect  social  state,  which  we  are  gradually  approaching  (with  its 
ethics  of  amity).  "Or  rather,  let  us  say,  to  ward  off  its  superfluous 
sufferings."  5 

"The  beneficence  which  takes  into  account  not  only  the  imme- 
diate and  remote  results  to  the  individual  but  also  the  results  to 
posterity  and  to  society  at  large  is  best."  6 

Thus  the  evolutionary  ethics,  like  the  higher,  universalistic 
utilitarianism  of  Mill,  issues  in  the  highest  altruism.  It  culminates 
in  love,7  and  finds  its  crowning  teaching  in  the  injunction,  expli- 
citly quoted  by  Mill,8  that  bids  us  "love  our  neighbor  as  ourself."9 

1  N.  and  P.  B.,  p.  391. 

2  Ibid,  p.  342;  p.  275. 

3  Ibid,  p.  342. 

4  Ibid,  p.  422. 

5  Ibid,   p.  430. 

6  Ibid. 

7  Ibid,  p.  270. 

8  Utilitarianism,  p.  25. 

9  We  find  significant  here,  whatever  may  be  its  full  justice,  Martineau's 
remark  that  "the  representatives  of  this  (Hedonistic  Utilitarian)  philosophy 
have  in  truth — greatly  to  their  honor — theorized  in  one  language  an<i  feit  |n 
another;  and  have  retained  ideal  conceptions  of  a  scale  of  good  and  admira- 
tion for  types  of  character,  for  which  their  doctrines  can  find  no  corresponding 
place."     (T.  of  E.  T.,  Vol.  II.,  p.  424.) 


28  EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IX    ETHICS. 


CHAPTER  III. 


THE      EVOLUTION    OF      ETHICS. 

The  doctrine  of  sympathy  plays  an  immense  part  in  evolution- 
ism, "the  all-important  emotion  of  sympathy"  Darwin  1  calls  it.  Dar- 
win was  the  first  to  apply  it  to  the  explanation  of  the  moral  nature 
of  man,  to  describe  what  we  have  called  in  this  chapter,  "the  evolu- 
tion of  ethics."  2  He  was  the  pioneer  of  those  who  assign  a  purely 
naturalistic  origin  to  morality.  In  Chap.  IV  of  the  "Descent  of 
Man,"  Darwin  makes  the  first  attempt  to  derive  the  moral  sense 
in  man  from  the  lower  animals,  through  the  social  instinct  and  the 
wortyng  of  "natural  selection"  combined  with  the  growth  of  intelli- 
gence in  man.  The  social  instinct  he  regards  as  an  extension  of 
the  parental  and  filial  affections  through  habit  and  natural  selec- 
tion. Sympathy,  fidelity  and  courage,  implied  in  mutual  aid  and 
defense,  he  regards  as  probably  acquired  by  the  same  means.  Of 
two  tribes,  the  one  more  courageous,  sympathetic  and  faithful,  mu- 
tually helpful  and  defensive,  would  succeed  better  and  conquer 
others ;  it  would  spread  and  be  widely  victorious,  and  thus,  through 
natural  selection,  social  and  moral  qualities  would  advance  and  be 
diffused  throughout  the  world.  The  process,  even  as  tentatively 
sketched  by  Darwin,  is  very  complex,  involving  many  factors,  such 
as  "the  approbation  of  others — the  strengthening  of  sympathies  by 
,  habit — example  and  imitation — reason — experience,  and  even  self- 
interest — instruction  during  youth  and  religious  feelings  ;"3  but  the 
foundation  is  sympathy,  enforced  and  rendered  increasingly  power- 
ful through  natural  selection. 

What  Darwin  tentatively  advanced  has  been  elaborated  and 
illustrated  with  a  wealth  of  detail  by  Alexander  Sutherland  in  his 
celebrated  account  of  the  origin  and  rise  of  the  moral  instinct.  Fol- 
lowing Darwin  he  explains  the  growth  of  the  moral  feelings,  and 
the  sentiment  of  right,  duty,  etc.,  as  due  wholly  to  sympathy,  orig- 
inating in  the  parental  and  conjugal  affections,  which  he  traces  back 
to  their  feeble  beginnings  in  the  lowest  animals,  and  which,  through 
a   gradually   ascending   scale,   become   the   rules   of   right    and   the 

1  Descent  of  Man,  Chap.  IV. 

_'  In  the  sense  of  the  evolution  of  the  ethical  sentiment. 

3  Williams,  R.  of  E.   B.,  ]>.   12. 


EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS.  2g 

principles  of  even  an  ideal  morality;  though  morality  at  its  best  is 
but  one  method  in  race  preservation,  only  one  factor,  though  the 
highest  and  best,  in  the  evolution  of  the  universe.  Morality  is 
"peri-hestic,"  originating  in  the  family,1  although  through  an  ex- 
tension of  sympathy  which  is  but  a  further  development  of  conjugal 
and  parental  love,  it  becomes  "aphestic,"  i.  e.,  operative  outside  of  the 
immediate  family  circle  and  made  to  include,  not  merely  husband 
and  wife  and  children,  brothers  and  sisters  and  all  blood  relations, 
but  the  members  of  society  in  general  in  ever  widening  groups,  as 
social  unions  become  larger,  as  they  ever  tend  to  do  through  the 
constant  increase  of  sympathy  due  to  the  elimination  of  the  unsym- 
pathetic by  natural  selection,  and  the  production  of  superior  types 
with  finer  nerve-susceptibility,  through  the  diminution  of  offspring 
— with  which  goes  greater  parental  care.  Morality  is  but  sympathy, 
and  the  average  sympathy  as  expressed  at  any  time  in  public  opin- 
ion, custom,  law  constitutes  duty,  which  derives  its  binding  character 
from  having  existed  in  us  from  an  unremembered  time,  and  grows 
constantly  stronger  as  the  same  social  sympathies  receive  sanction 
and  expression,  generation  after  generation.  Inward  morality,  as 
seen  in  the  feeling  of  self-respect,  is  similarly  explained  as  a  man's 
applying  external  standards  to  judge  himself;  and  the  right  is  re- 
garded as  a  continual  and  reasonable  compromise  of  a  man's  selfish 
instincts  with  the  moral  or  unselfish. 

Sutherland's  account,  which  is  highly  interesting,  because  of 
its  great  importance  given  more  in  detail,  is  as  follows. 

He  finds  the  underlying  feature  of  the  daily  history  of  animal 
life  to  be  one  continuous  and  stupendous  slaughter,  millions  of 
creatures  perishing  that  one  may  exist.  It  is  only  through  stupend- 
ous fertility  and  the  development  of  qualities  procuring  more  or  less 
immunity  that  any  given  species  can  continue  to  exist.  The  few 
survivors  restock  the  world,  who  though  limited  in  number  are  bet- 
ter protected.  Two  surviving  cod,  for  instance,  out  of  the  millions 
hatched,  would  keep  the  species  constant.  In  an  average  of  75 
species  of  fishes,  there  are  646,000  eggs  to  each  female.  Out  of 
300,000  of  these,  with  no  help,  care,  or  protection  of  the  young,  only 
one  will  reach  maturity.  Where  there  is  an  advance  in  nerve  de- 
velopment, leading  to  a  nobler  type,  chance  of  survival  is  the  small- 
est,  and  there   is  invariably   some   little  manifestation  of  parental 

l  Cf.  Qreen,  Prolegomena,  p.  257.    Bee  also  infra..  Chap.  VI.,  i>.  •*»'.>. 


3o  EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS. 

care.  In  some  fishes  that  have  a  pouch  beneath  the  body  (syngno- 
thidae),  the  young  have  the  instinct  of  returning  for  several  days 
to  the  parental  shelter.1  Two  much  more  promising  courses  are 
nest-building  and  hatching  of  eggs  in  the  body  of  the  female.  "In 
the  struggle  for  existence  an  immense  premium  is  placed  upon  par- 
ental care,  and  not  until  this  has  been  developed  can  the  higher 
types  become  possible."  2  A  prime  feature  of  the  development  is  the 
steady  diminution  in  number  of  offspring  as  parental  care  increases. 
The  average  per  annum  is  of  amphibia  441,  reptiles  17,  birds  5, 
mammals  3.2  ,  higher  mammals  1.3,  and  in  apes  and  mankind  one 
in  every  two  years.  Only  the  development  of  remarkable  faculties 
could  save  the  human  race  from  destruction  with  only  one  per 
annum.  The  progress  most  essential  is  parental  care,  and  there 
is  no  gap  throughout  the  history  of  life  from  love  of  fish  to  affec- 
tion of  father  and  mother.  There  is  no  indication  in  either  fish  or 
reptile  even  in  the  highest  grade  of  that  helplessness  at  birth  which 
is  the  concomitant  of  any  notable  degree  of  conscious  parental 
care.3  Slowly-unfolding  maturity,  essential  to  the  finest  nerve- 
organism,  seems  to  involve  an  early  period  of  helplessness  demand- 
ing an  instinct  of  self-sacrifice  on  the  part  of  the  mother.  This  is 
only  primitive  in  fish  and  reptiles.  So  far  there  is  no  hint  of  af- 
fection. That  begins  with  the  mother' sympathy  which  in  mammals 
is  incalculably  slow,  in  birds  more  rapid,  "the  creeping  growth  of 
those  sweeter  feelings  that  alone  make  life  worth  living."  4  High 
and  nesting  birds  are  utterly  dependent  on  their  parents  for  food 
and  "it  is  a  likely  thing  that  elevated  nests  were  concomitant  with 
helpless  youth,  parental  affection,  and  an  increasing  scope  for 
growth  of  intelligence."  5  In  birds  of  the  six  most  gifted  orders, 
whose  young  are  hatched  in  the  most  abject  helplessness,  parental 
love  is  poured  out  in  floods  of  unmeasured  self-sacrifice.  There  is 
a  gracious  charm  of  family  life  and  with  it,  by  no  mere  chance, 
comes  "that  delight  in  throbbing  melody  which  proclaims  the  fullest 
tide  of  joyous  life."  6  Male  and  female  unite  in  tender  care  and 
show  also  steady  attachment  to  each  other.  They  construct  re- 
markably beautiful  nests,  showing  adaptive  intelligence.  The  more 
highly  developed  the  bird,  the  more  helpless  the  young  at  birth; 

1  Sutherland,  Origin  and  Growth  of  the  Moral  Instinct,  Vol.  I.,  p.  33. 

2  Ibid,   p.   40. 

3  Ibid,  p.  52. 

4  Ibid,  p.  53. 

5  Ibid,  p.  63. 

6  Ibid,  p.  ai. 


EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS. 


3i 


the  parrot,  the  most  intelligent  of  birds,  being  ninety  days  depend- 
ent. There  are  increasing  tendencies  to  prolongation  of  family  life, 
which  is  the  ultimate  basis  of  moral  ideas.  The  nest  life  of  one  of 
those  higher  birds  is  marked  by  many  graces  of  indubitably  moral 
character,  the  conjugal  tenderness  of  mated  pair  and  unwearied 
self-sacrifice  in  ministering  to  offspring  being  "ethically  beautiful." 
Growing  intelligence  makes  the  young  more  and  more  dependent 
upon  family  and  social  union.1  In  mammals,  the  period  of  gestation 
of  the  non-deciduous  Placentalia  is  remarkably  long, — from  150 
days  in  sheep,  goat  or  ibex,  to  280  days  in  cow,  bison,  stag,  or  yak; 
the  result  of  which  is  that  the  young  are  in  remarkably  complete 
condition,  well-equipped  for  survival  in  size,  speed,  formidable  horns 
and  tusks ;  but  efficiency  is  doubly  and  trebly  assured  by  a  strength 
and  devotion  of  parental  affection  almost  on  a  level  with  the  highest 
in  birds.  There  is  a  surprising  smallness  (with  few  exceptions)  in 
the  number  of  offspring,  and  therefore  the  maternal  relationship  is 
of  a  higher  order,  the  source  of  many  charming  capacities  of  affec- 
tion. The  young  require  different  food  from  the  parents,  and  a 
strange  reflex  action  begins  to  develop  the  mammae  or  milk-secret- 
ing organs.  In  monkeys  there  is  a  lengthened  period  of  sucking  and 
an  intensity  of  affection.  The  connection  of  the  tissues  of  mother 
and  offspring  is  more  intimate  and  highly  developed  in  these  quad- 
rumana  and  in  the  human  species  than  in  any  other  animal,  and  the 
period  of  gestation  is  the  longest  known :  and  there  is  the  highest 
standard  of  unconscious  preliminary  maternal  care,  rendering  possible 
the  loftiest  type  of  intelligence.  "The  monkey  brings  up  her  young 
very  much  in  the  same  way  as  man,  often  with  excessive  tenderness 
and  care,  shown  especially  in  combing,  carrying,  and  searching  for 
parasites.  Males  and  females  defend  the  young  with  bravery,  box 
their  ears  or  cudgel  them  if  they  have  failed  to  render  obedience. 
They  lead  them  about  in  their  tender  years  and  afterwards  guide 
them  in  climbing,  running  and  leaping."  2  In  the  anthropoid  apes 
is  best  discerned  the  coming  perfection  of  Parental  Care  in  the  hu- 
man species.  All  the  details  of  propagation  are  entirely  similar. 
The  male  organs  are  entirely  analogous  and  in  the  female  there  is 
the  first  indication  of  menstrual  flow.  The  placenta  and  milk  glands 
are  entirely  analogous.  P.'  C.  approximates  closely  to  that  of  the 
savage  man.     "The  young  at  birth  in  all  apes  are  taken  into  the 

1  Ibid,  p.  69. 

2  Ibid,  p.  93.     (Quoted  fr.  Vogt,  Mammalia,  p.  44.) 


32  KVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IX    ETHICS. 

arms  of  the  mother,  and  there  clasped  with  a  fond  pride."  The 
maternal  tenderness  is  very  touching,  "the  long  hand  of  the  mother 
stroking  back  the  shaggy  hair  of  the  brow,  while  she  looks  down 
with  yearning  affection  into  liquid  depths  of  the  brown  eyes."  *  Next 
to  the  human  babe,  the  infant  ape  is  the  most  helpless  of  all  new- 
born creatures.  At  the  head  of  the  highest  group,  foremost  in  all 
respects,  stand  man.  The  period  of  gestation  in  man  is,  in  pro- 
portion to  size,  the  longest  known;  and  the  union  of  maternal  and 
foetal  tissues  is  the  most  complex  and  the  babe  is  the  most  helpless 
of  infant  creatures.  There  is  greatly-increased  nerve  complexity. 
The  new-born  babe  has  a  brain  more  than  eight  times  as  great  (in 
proportion)  as  in  adults,  being  l>7th  of  its  body.  The  care  of  the 
naked  savage  mother  is  greater  than  that  of  any  of  the  lower  ani- 
mals. There  is  a  diminution  in  the  number  of  offspring  (less  than 
one  in  two  years;  in  civilized  the  average  is  less  than  one  in  four 
years)  and  an  increase  in  the  period  of  maternal  devotion.  The 
average  period  of  lactation  is  iy2  years,  but  savage  children  have 
been  known  to  suck  as  old  as  5  and  6.  "It  is  in  love  for  the  child- 
ren, concern  for  their  sufferings,  delight  in  their  sports,  that  the 
more  beautifully  human  creatures  begin  to  display  themselves."  2 
In  the  lessons  of  self-sacrifice  first  learned  is  the  earliest  fount  of 
moral  feeling.  "In  the  fierce  competition  of  the  animated  forms  of 
earth,  the  loftier  type,  with  its  prolonged  nervous  growth,  and  con- 
sequently augmented  period  of  helpfulness,  can  never  arise  but  with 
concomitant  increase  of  parental  care."3  The  fount  of  maternal 
feelings  is  as  automatic  as  the  fount  of  milk,  both  being  biologic 
features.  From  the  fount  of  parental  emotions,  high  in  the  ape, 
still  higher  in  savage  races,  grow  all  the  varied  virtues  which  form 
the  pre-eminence  of  man.  With  increasing  intelligence  goes  diminu- 
tion of  offspring.  Children  of  smaller  families  have  the  better 
chance.  The  average  number  of  children  is  a  trifle  over  four 
to  each  marriage.  Abortion  and  infanticide,  "the  first  unlovely 
marks  of  reason,"  check  the  growth  of  population.  The  savage  in 
no  way  restrains  his  passion.  Infanticide  results  "from  hardness 
of  life  rather  than  from  hardness  of  heart"  4  and  is  no  failure  of 
parental  instinct.  The  savage  loves  his  offspring,  and  those  whom 
he  spares  he  spoils.    Chastity  fosters  parental  care.    The  educational 

1  Ibid,  p.  94. 

2  Ibid,  p.  '.>'.). 

3  Ibid. 

4  Tylor,  Anthropology,  p.  427.     Quoted   by  Sutherland,  p.  115. 


EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS.  33 

care  of  the  young,  destined  to  be  most  notable  in  the  humanizing 
influence  of  progress,  begins  to  assert  itself.  In  the  barbarian  stage 
there  is  already  a  beginning  of  systematic  attempts  to  form  the 
character.  Training,  at  first,  is  always  of  an  almost  exclusively 
domestic  character.  Infanticide  gradually  dies  out  with  the  asser- 
tion of  the  more  sympathetic  side  of  man's  nature.1  In  cultured 
races  there  is  self-restraint,  the  postponing  of  marriage,  and  celibacy. 
The  increased  age  of  marriage  diminishes  the  number  of  offspring. 
Celibacy  of  women  also  increases  P.  C,  in  the  form  of  the  affec- 
tion of  maiden-aunts  and  grown-up  sisters.  In  civilized  communities 
young  folks  spend  about  sixteen  or  seventeen  years  under  the 
parents'  roof.  (The  wonderful  activity  in  the  systematic  education 
of  both  sexes,  together  with  increasing  leisure  through  labor-saving 
machinery,  will  extend  the  preparatory  period  of  youth,  which  with 
increasing  intelligence  and  diminishing  number  of  offspring  will 
prolong  the  period  of  P.  C.)  Want  of  P.  C.  eliminates  the  inferior 
elements  of  each  race  as  it  does  the  lower  races.  "Thus  the  law 
that  progress  lies  with  less  offspring  and  greater  parental  care  ob- 
tains to  the  very  highest  domain  of  the  animal  kingdom  and  works 
a  beneficent  change  in  the  constitution  of  society."  2  The  moral 
class  would  supplant  the  immoral  at  a  much  more  rapid  rate  than 
above.  "The  progress  of  society  depends  less  upon  education  and 
the  transmission  of  acquired  characteristics  than  on  a  steady  progress 
of  elimination  of  inferior  strains."  3  Want  of  maternal  love  will 
work  its  own  disappearance  and  the  unnatural  strain  will  die  out 
before  the  natural.  "In  the  highest  races  of  men  as  in  the  lowest 
species  of  fish,  a  little  parental  love  and  devotion  is  of  more  efficacy 
than  a  great  fertility.  Parental  sympathy  has  steadily  developed 
because  it  has  always  been  a  notable  element  in  securing  the  sur- 
vival of  a  species  or  of  a  superior  strain  within  a  species.4  In- 
creasing intelligence  always  implies  a  more  prolonged  period  of 
immaturity  and  this  demands  an  increasing  parental  sympathy." 
Parental  Sympathy  is  the  basis  for  all  other  sympathy  and  sympathy 
in  general  is  the  ultimate  basis  of  all  moral  feeling. 

A  second  form  of  sympathy,  doubling  efficiency,  is  that  of  the 
mated  pair,  or  conjugal  sympathy.     Sweetness  and  graciousness  of 

1  Sutherland,  O.  &  D.  of  M.  I.,  p.  145. 

2  Ibid,  p.  154. 

3  Ibid,  p.  155. 

4  Ibid,  p.  156. 


34 


EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS. 


disposition  are  deceptive  elements  in  the  securing  of  mates.  The 
tendency  is  to  breed  by  preference  from  the  more  sympathetic. 
Courtship  depends  largely  on  capacity  for  sympathy.  The  winning 
in  manner  are  the  first  and  best  married.  "At  all  times  the  gentle 
and  loving  disposition  has  been  most  readily  and  most  permanently 
married."  *  In  the  lower  scale  of  animals  there  is  very  little  indi- 
cation of  conjugal  sympathy.  There  is  no  instance  among  cold- 
blooded animals,  and  in  even  warm-blooded  the  progress  is  slow, 
birds  showing  more  than  the  average  mammal.  There  is  no  sort 
of  sympathy  between  monotremes.  It  is  equally  small  in  lower 
marsupials  where  the  female  is  devoted,  but  where  there  is  no  con- 
jugal happiness.  Phalangers,  always  seen  in  pairs,  are  affectionate; 
the  Sirenia  are  sociable,  also  cetacea;  but  of  true  C.  S.  there  is  no 
evidence  in  the  lower  mammalia.  Hedgehogs  are  permanently  united 
in  pairs  and  are  very  affectionate.  Bats  are  gregarious,  but  there 
is  no  C.  S.  and  the  sexes  are  segregated.  Among  rodents,  there 
is  some  C.  S.  and  family  life.  There  is  very  little  improvement 
among  the  carnivora.  In  every  species  the  male  must  court  and 
coax  and  not  compel  the  female.  In  the  main,  the  birds  are  char- 
acterized by  a  C.  S.  that  has  no  doubt  been  an  element  in  securing 
for  them  their  world-wide  profusion.  The  lowest  of  the  birds,  as 
of  the  ostrich  order,  are  quite  on  a  level  with  any  of  the  preceding 
mammalia.  Swans  pair  for  life  and  there  is  mutual  tenderness  and 
fidelity.  Of  wading  birds,  out  of  223  genera,  67  mate  for  life, 
among  them  the  plover,  ibis,  spoonbill,  stork,  screamer  and  jucana, 
in  unfading  tenderness.  From  pigeons  upwards,  conjugal  affection 
among  birds  is  striking,  particularly  the  devotion  of  doves,  whose 
loving  attention  to  the  male  is  continued  all  the  year  round  and,  in 
a  large  proportion  of  cases,  unions  are  broken  only  by  the  death 
of  one.  The  great  majority  of  higher  birds  are  monogamous  and 
their  unions  are  life-long.  In  many  hundreds  of  species  repeated 
instances  are  recorded  where  "each  bird  is  nursed  and  fed  by  its 
mate  and  its  death  is  followed  by  disconsolate  mourning,  often  by 
the  steady  decline  and  decease  of  the  bereaved  partner."  2  Grosbeaks 
are  self-sacrificing  in  the  highest  degree.  Even  birds  of  prey  seem 
to  pair  for  life.  In  mammals,  only  the  highest  species  show  any 
of  this  nobler  conjugal  attachment.     Most  of  the  monkey  class  are 

1  O.  and  D.  of  M.  I.,  p.  160. 
2  Ibid,  p.  168. 


EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS. 


35 


polygamous,  though  "some  of  the  Indian  and  American  monkeys 
are  strictly  monogamous."  '  The  sexes  are  sympathetic,  apart  from 
sexual  passion,  and  there  are  "many  records  of  cases  in  which  mon- 
keys have  died  of  grief  after  the  loss  of  their  well-beloved  spouse."2 
In  the  anthropoid  apes,  the  father  takes  still  more  prominent  part 
in  the  care  of  offspring  and  the  tendency  to  monogamy  is  un- 
doubted. 

In  the  lower  ranks  of  savage  life  there  is  a  certain  degree  of 
improvement,  male  and  female  spending  their  lives  together;  and 
the  unions  in  the  main  are  monogamous,  with  a  permanent  father 
and  mother  united  by  loving  care  of  offspring.  In  lowest  savage 
life  there  is  not  the  remotest  vestige  of  chastity.  The  young  in- 
dulge in  promiscuous  intercourse,  a  special  pair  finally  gravitating 
to  each  other.  The  conjugal  condition  of  lower  savages  is  in  ad- 
vance of  that  of  the  apes,  but  quite  comparable.  Yet  monogamy 
prevails,  and  "There  grows  the  natural  propensity  to  happiness  of 
family  life."  Among  the  higher  savages  there  is  something  like 
customary  law.  "The  natural  tendency  of  the  human  race  is  to 
drift  into  monogamous  unions."3  The  first  faint  dawning  of  chas- 
tity is  in  the  middle  grade  of  savage  life,  the  change  being  due  to 
C.  S.,  though  having  required  long  ages  for  its  development.  The 
chaste  woman  leaves  behind  her  far  more  offspring  than  the  un- 
chaste. There  is  a  growing  sense  of  possession  in  man,  particu- 
larly with  the  establishment  of  marriage  which  is  (lst)  by  purchase 
or  (2nd)  by  capture,  which  makes  for  chastity,  as  the  man  will  tol- 
erate no  promiscuity  in  the  wife  whom  he  has  bought  or  acquired. 
Purchase  increases  the  stability  of  unions,  and  the  selfish  interests 
of  fathers  and  husbands  secure  chastity.  The  chastity  of  men  is 
a  later  ideal  depending  wholly  upon  sympathy. 

The  family  is  the  birthplace  of  all  moral  relations.4  The 
fundamental  sympathies  towards  child  and  wife  spread  out  to 
brothers,  sisters,  blood-relations,  and  neighbors — into  a  general 
social  sympathy — whenever  and  wherever  an  advantage5  is  likely 
to  arise  therefrom.  The  life  of  the  species  is  furthered  by  gregari- 
ousness.  There  are  three  conditions  in  the  development  of  the  social 
sympathies, — mere   agglomeration,   selfish  co-operation  and   sympa- 

1  Darwin,  D.  of  M..  p.  590.     Quoted  by  Sutherland,  p.  172. 

2  Sutherland,  p.  172. 

3  Ibid,  p.  185. 

4  Cf.  Green,  Proleg..  p.  257.     See  below,  Chap.  VI.,  p.  59. 

5  Fundamentally  utilitarian  also. 


36  EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS. 

thetic  union.  Besides  mere  "physical  assemblage,"  1  hunger,  fear  and 
sex-appetite  are  bonds  of  union.  There  are  singular  social  customs 
in  ants  and  bees,  so  that  an  ant-hill  or  bee-hive  are  no  mere  agglomer- 
ations. The  sympathy  in  ants,  though  exaggerated,  is  considerable, 
but  it  is  different  from  that  in  warm-blooded  animals.  There  is  no 
sympathy  in  fishes.  Development  keeps  pace  with  vocal  powers, 
there  being  some  relation  of  causation.  The  voice  is  used  for  sexual 
attraction.  Anseres  are  social,  terns  give  assistance  to  wounded, 
flamingoes  post  sentinels,  and  there  is  united  defence  among  many 
species.  In  the  higher  birds  there  are  active  sentiments  of  good- 
will and  actual  capacity  for  self-sacrifice.  There  is  cordial  union 
among  beavers.  The  elephant  is  sympathetic,  the  dog  highly  so. 
Sympathy  is  at  its  highest  natural  level  in  monkeys  and  apes. 
There  is  fellow-love  in  monkeys  and  their  richness  of  vocabulary 
is  next  to  man.  The  baboon  is  most  richly  endowed  and  the  gorilla 
and  chimpanzee  head  the  whole  mammals  except  man.  In  the  low- 
est savages  there  is  an  advance  over  the  highest  social  life  of  ani- 
mals. "Mankind  can  never  have  lived  a  mere  struggling  crowd  each 
for  himself.  Society  is  always  made  up  of  families  bound  together 
by  kindly  ties.  Their  habits,  judged  by  our  notions,  are  hard  and 
coarse,  yet  the  family  tie  of  sympathy  and  common  interests  are 
the  foundation  of  moral  duty  already  laid  in  the  mother's  patient 
tenderness,  the  father's  desperate  valor  in  defence  of  home,  their 
daily  care  for  the  little  ones,  the  affection  of  brothers  and  sisters,  and 
the  mutual  forbearance,  hopefulness  and  trust  of  all."2 

Social  sympathy  in  mankind  arises  in  the  family.  Love  of 
own  child  predisposes  to  tenderness  toward  children  in  general,  and 
indeed  to  a  certain  compassionateness  to  the  young  of  all  animals. 
C.  S.  also  spreads  out  to  regard  for  woman.  The  course  of  history 
becomes  the  emergence  of  the  social.  Strong  social  sympathies  be- 
come the  most  profitable  means  of  progress,  as,  for  instance,  Greece 
under  Alexander  and  in  Rome.  There  is  increasing  size  of  social 
unions.  This  assists^  in  the  conversion  from  wanderers  to  settled 
population.  Great  cities  like  London,  Paris,  New  York  are  triumphs 
of  social  sympathies.  Sympathy  must  deepen  before  it  can  widen. 
The  growth  of  sympathy  is  shown  in  benevolence,  in  alms-giving, 
in  the  building  of  hospitals,  in  the  poor-law  system,  in  humaner 

1  Buffon,   quoted  by  S.,  p.  293. 

2  Tylor,  Anthropology,  p.  402.     Quoted   by   S.,  p.  352. 


EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS.  37 

treatment  of  the  insane.  The  nineteenth  century  particularly  wit- 
nessed a  huge  growth  in  sympathy,  shown  by  the  lessening  ferocity 
of  warfare  and  the  increasing  growth  of  the  peace  sentiment. 

Sympathy  is  a  natural  morality,  "not  a  complete  morality,  but 
a  very  serviceable,  home-spun  article,  extremely  good  of  its  kind."  * 
There  are  three  higher  stages,  the  morality  of  duty,  the  morality  of 
self-respect,  and  the  "morality  that  springs  from  an  ideal  of  the 
beauty  of  goodness."  Of  all  these  sympathy  is  the  natural  basis. 
Sympathy  or  love  is  morality.  Each  of  the  virtues  necessary  to 
right  conduct  is  directly  or  indirectly  founded  on  sympathy. 

The  morality  of  sympathy  alone  is  an  "inconstant  regulator." 
The  sympathy  of  a  race  finds  expression  in  maxims  or  in  laws  when 
public  opinion  enforces  that  conduct  which  is  accordant  with  the 
average  sympathy,  giving  rise  to  the  sense  of  duty,  which  is  what 
the  average  sympathy  of  the  race  demands.  Its  absolute  uncondi- 
tional character  is  due  to  the  sanction  of  ordinances  existing  from 
earliest  time.2  The  sanctions  which  give  to  any  duty  its  impressive- 
ness  arise  from  (1)  public  opinion,  (2)  imitation,  (3)  authority,  and 
(4)  habit.  If  deference  to  authority  be  not  sympathetic,  it  gives 
rise  only  to  a  prudent  self-concern,  a  quasi-moral ity,  useful  to 
society,  but  not  in  any  way  akin  to  the  moral  idea.  Only  when 
sympathetic  does  a  feeling  of  reverence  for  authority  produce  a 
true  morality.  Public  opinion,  operating  from  a  period  of  infancy 
unremembered  by  us,  is  the  real  basis  of  duty.  The  true  moral 
duty,  based  on  permanent  sympathies,  gathers  force  as  the  genera- 
tions pass.  Morality  is  not  yet  complete.  It  assumes  a  very  noble 
aspect  when,  to  sympathy  and  a  cheerful  compliance  with  duty 
whose  sanction  is  external,  there  is  added  a  complete  surrender  to 
that  sense  of  self-respect  which  is  only  duty  with  an  internal  emo- 
tion. When  the  stage  is  reached  wherein  an  idea  of  loveliness  has 
gathered  around  the  appearance  of  kindness,  purity  and  truth, 
morality  has  assumed  the  highest  aspect.  There  are  two  ideals  of 
virtue, — the  manly,  courageous  one  and  the  soft,  tender,  womanly 
one.  Practical  morality  rules  the  everyday  affairs  of  life.  The 
quasi-moral  is  of  equal  utility  with  the  true.  Its  basis  is  in  respon- 
sibility, which  ripens  into  law.     Necessitarianism  is  the  outcome  of 

1  Preliminary  Outline,   Vol.   I.,  p.   11. 

2  However,  only  "within  the  individual";  far  better  in  Spencer,  who  makes 
the  moral  intuitions  organized  in  the  race.    Cf.  supra,  Chap.  II,  p.  14. 


38  EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS. 

scientific  research,  and  in  no  case  do  we  need  to  suppose  the  indi- 
vidual a  free  agent.  "The  idea  of  responsibility  in  no  way  implies 
the  possession  of  free-will,  but  only  a  mind  sane  enough  to  foresee 
consequences  and  a  knowledge  that  the  individual  will  reap  the 
fruit  of  his  action,  among  these  the  diminished  or  increased  good- 
will of  his  fellows."  x  Responsibility  is  "perihestic,"  i.  e.,  within 
the  family  and  "aphestic,"  i.  e.,  outside  the  family,  giving  rise  to 
public  law.  Law  never  gave  rise  to  moral  feeling,  but  moral  feeling 
gave  rise  to  law. 

Sympathy  is  only  a  general  term  we  give  to  that  subtle  sus- 
ceptibility of  nerve  which  renders  an  individual  ready  to  catch  the 
contagion  of  the  emotions  of  another  individual. 2 

Moral  instinct  does  not  teach  a  man  what  is  right  and  wrong. 
Moral  instincts  are  founded  on  sympathy  and  serve  to  check  and 
limit  the  play  of  selfish  instincts  in  the  interests  of  the  preservation 
of  the  community  or  of  the  species.  Right  conduct  is  a  reasonable 
compromise  between  the  selfish  and  the  moral.  But  as  an  absolute 
and  universal  fact  there  is  neither  right  nor  wrong. 

To  this  account  of  Sutherland  of  the  nature  and  origin  of  the 
moral  instinct  we  may  add  the  ideas  of  Kropotkin. 

With  Kropotkin,3  too,  "love,  sympathy  and  self-sacrifice,"  play 
"an  immense  part"  in  the  evolution  of  the  moral  sentiment,  but  "it 
is  not  love  and  not  even  sympathy  upon  which  society  is  based," 
according  to  him,  but  upon  "the  conscience — be  it  only  at  the  stage 
of  an  instinct — of  human  solidarity"  4  It  is  from  a  recognition  of 
the  benefit  of  mutual  aid  and  the  increase  of  happiness  of  each  by 
each  and  particularly  the  sense  of  justice  or  equity  5  that  the  higher 
moral  feelings  are  developed. 

Kropotkin  doubts  the  reality  of  the  fearful  competition  for 
food  and  life  within  the  same  species.  In  his  travels  and  studies  he 
says  he  saw  rather  Mutual  Aid  and  Mutual  Support  as  the  factors 
of  the  greatest  consequence  in  the  preservation  of  life  and  further 
evolution  of  the  species.  The  scarcity  of  food  in  impoverished  dis- 
tricts and  the  poor  health  of  the  animals  made  it  absolutely  im- 
possible that  any  progressive  evolution  could  be  based  on  keen  com- 

1  Preliminary  Outline,  Vol.  I.,  p.  14. 

2  Ibid,  p.  18. 

3  Mutual  Aid    (1904). 

4  Ibid,  Introd.,  p.  13. 

5  Regarded  by  Spencer  as  a  form  of  sympathy.    See  supra,  Chap.  II,  p.  24. 


EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS.  3g 

petition.  He  refuses  to  admit,  and  holds  that  it  is  not  proven,  that 
struggle  between  individuals  of  the  same  species  is  a  "law  of  nature." 
He  considers  Kessler's  1  law  of  mutual  aid  far  more  important  than 
mutual  contests.  Darwin  himself  recognized  mutual  aid  as  a  prime 
factor  in  evolution.2  He  differs  from  Kessler  as  to  parental  feel- 
ing being  the  source  of  mutual  inclinations  in  animals,  seeming  in- 
clined to  attribute  it  to  "sociability  proper."  However,  the  main  thing 
is  to  establish  the  importance  of  mutual  aids,  the  origin  of  which 
may  be  left  to  further  research.  Basing  human  ethics  on  love  and 
personal  sympathy,  as  in  Sutherland,  he  thinks  has  only  contributed 
to  narrow  the  comprehension  of  the  moral  feeling  as  a  whole.3  A  far 
wider  feeling  or  instinct  he  considers  human  solidarity  and  socia- 
bility, the  beginning  of  which  is  seen  in  the  herding  of  animals.  The 
"fittest"  are  not  the  physically  strongest  nor  the  cunningest,  but  those 
who  learn  to  combine  so  as  mutually  to  support  each  other.  The 
most  sympathetic  members  would  flourish  best  and  rear  the  greatest 
number  of  offspring.  Sociability  is  as  much  a  law  of  nature  as 
mutual  struggle.  The  "fittest"  are  the  most  social,  who  have  more 
chances  to  survive,  and  to  attain  the  highest  development  of  intelli- 
gence and  bodily  organization.  Mutual  aid  thus  becomes  a  factor 
in  evolution  of  the  highest  importance,  even  surpassing  mutual 
struggle.4  Kropotkin  traces  the  growth  of  mutual  aid  in  animals 
and  mankind,  showing  how  association  and  mutual  helpfulness  are 
the  rule  with  mammals,  reaching  their  fullest  development  in  the 
higher  vertebrates,  becoming  conscious  and  reasoned  in  man.  Socia- 
bility is  of  the  greatest  advantage  in  the  struggle  for  life  and  favors 
the  growth  of  intelligence.  He  does  not  consider  competition,  but 
co-operation,  as  a  cause  of  evolution ;  and  traces  its  influence  among 
savages  and  barbarians,  in  the  mediaeval  cities  with  their  trade-guilds 
and  craft-guilds,  in  institutions  of  the  present  time  such  as  the  village 
communities  in  Russia,  in  labor-unions,  and  in  countless  societies  for 
combined  action  for  all  possible  purposes.  "In  the  practice  of 
mutual  aid  which  we  can  retrace  to  the  earliest  beginnings  of  evolu- 
tion, we  thus  find  the  positive  and  undoubted  origin  of  our  ethical 
conceptions."  5 


1  Russian   Naturalist,  d.  1881. 

2  Descent  of  Man,  p.  63  ff. 

3  M.  A.,   Introd.,   p.  12. 

4  Ibid,  p.  8. 

5  Ibid,  p.  300. 


40  EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS. 

CHAPTER  IV. 


IDEALISM— IMMANUEL   KANT. 

Having  examined  the  evolutionary  ethics,  we  turn  now  to 
Idealism. 

Idealism  is  that  view  of  life  which  has  for  its  philosophic  foun- 
dation the  reduction  of  all  things  to  ideas  in  consciousness.  According 
to  Idealism,  nothing  can  be  known  except  as  affecting  our  conscious- 
ness, as  ideas  of  the  mind,  as  appearing  to  a  conscious  subject  or 
Ego  to  which  things  are  presented  as  objects,  as  phenomena  of  con- 
sciousness, in  contradistinction  to  noumena  which  are  the  realities 
underlying  phenomena,  but  which  can  never  be  known  in  themselves, 
as  Dinge-an-sich,  but  only  as  appearing  to  a  conscious  subject. 

Idealism  is  as  old  as  Plato,  but  was  first  made  prominent  in 
modern  thought  by  Bishop  Berkeley,  who  may  rightly  be  regarded 
as  the  one  through  whom  in  more  recent  times  it  obtained  its  posi- 
tion of  importance,  influencing  also,  in  particular,  (though  he  never 
admitted  the  connection  of  his  thought  with  that  of  the  Irish  Bishop) 
the  great  Kant,  the  foremost  expositor  and  classic  figure  of  what 
is  known  today, — highly  developed  and  mightily  influential, — as  the 
system  of  Idealism. 

In  his  critical  exposition  of  the  philosophy  of  Kant,  Caird  l 
remarks,  "We  have  in  Kant's  ethical  works,  the  final  and  most  ex- 
plicit expression  of  a  view  of  the  moral  life  which,  in  some  form 
or  other,  has  held  the  balance  with  Hedonism  through  the  whole 
history  of  ethical  philosophy."  Caird  instances  the  Stoics  and  the 
Epicureans,  and  the  "endless  battle"  between  the  Nominalists  and 
the  Realists. 

It  is  as  expressive  of  this  contrast  with  the  evolutionary  phil- 
osophy, this  "vital  opposition,"  that  we  shall  consider  the  ethics 
of  Kant  as  typical  of  idealism  as  Spencer's  were  of  evolutionism; 
particularly  as  in  his  case,  also,  his  leading  ideas  and  fundamental 
principles  form  the  basis  of  the  ethical,  as  of  the  metaphysical, 
labors  of  his  successors. 

Kant's  ethical  system  may  be  found  in  the   (l)   "Grudlegung 
zur  Metaphysik  der  Sitten,"   (1785);   (2)  "Kritik  der  Praktischen 
Vernunft"  (1788)  ;  and  in  (3)  "Die  Metaphysik  der  Sitten"  (1797). 
"Die  Kritik  der  Urtheilskraft"  also  contains  some  ethical  matter. 
1  Vol.  II.,   p.  172. 


EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS.  4I 

Our  chief  concern,  according  to  Kant,  is  with  what  we  should 
be  and  do,  not  with  what  we  can  know. x  The  chief  questions  are 
practical  questions.  Kant  resorts  to  ethics  as  a  means  of  deliverance 
from  his  speculative  scepticism.  Ethics  as  the  means  of  giving 
authority  to  truth  of  every  kind  is  the  corner-stone  of  all  knowledge 
and  the  test  of  all  faith.  It  is  a  highly  curious  fact  that  as  it  was 
an  ethical  interest  that  led  Spencer  to  philosophy  so  it  was  a  specu- 
lative difficulty  that  prompted  Kant's  system  of  ethics. 

"In  order  that  an  action  should  be  morally  good  it  is  not  enough 
that  it  should  conform  to  the  moral  law  but  it  should  be  done  for 
the  sake  of  the  law."  2  A  good  will  alone  is  good ;  and  a  good 
will  is  good,  not  for  what  it  effects,  but  for  what  it  intends,  even 
when  it  fails  to  accomplish  its  purpose.  3  The  essential  thing  in 
the  moral  worth  of  actions  is  that  the  moral  law  alone,  independent 
of  every  other  consideration,  should  directly  determine  the  will.4 
Kant  appeals  to  the  universal  consciousness  of  man  to  decide  whether 
it  does  not  recognize  the  moral  law  as  altogether  a  priori. 5  Con- 
sciousness attests  that  as  far  as  the  relations  of  time  and  the  senses 
are  concerned  we  are  under  the  law  of  necessity ;  but  so  far  as  we 
are  conscious  of  ourselves  as  noumena  or  things  in  themselves  we 
are  certain  that  we  are  free.6  The  essence  of  a  man  is  his  charac- 
ter,— that  permanent  something  to  which  he  imputes  his  several 
acts. 7 

The  moral  law  is  to  be  obeyed  as  law  and  not  to  be  sought  as 
good.8  Virtue,  however,  is  worthy  of  happiness.  It  is  one  and  the 
same  reason  which,  whether  in  a  theoretical  or  practical  point  of  view, 
judges  according  to  a  priori  principles.9  The  existence  of  God  is 
implied  in  the  realization  of  the  summum  bonum  by  the  sole  agency 
which  is  conceivable  as  adequate  to  its  achievement — that  of  the  Su- 
preme.10 "Two  things  fill  the  mind  with  ever  new  and  increasing 
admiration  and  awe,  the  oftener  and  more  steadily  we  reflect  on 
them:  the  starry  heavens  above  and  the  moral  law  within."11 

1  Porter,  Kant.  p.  23. 

2  Preface  to  Metaphysic  of  Morals,  Abbot's  Translation,  p.  4. 

3  Metaphysic  of  Morals,  p.  10. 

4  Critique  of  Practical  Reason,  Chap.  III.,  Abbot,  p.  164. 

5  Ibid,  p.  185. 

6  Ibid,  p.  188. 

7  Ibid,  p.  191. 

8  Ibid.  p.  204. 

9  Ibid,  p.  217. 

10  Ibid,  p.  222. 

11  Ibid,  p.  260. 


42  EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS. 

According  to  Kant  reason  is  self-determined.  The  essence  of 
morality  lies  in  the  abstraction  from  all  particulars.  Nothing  in 
the  world,  or  even  without  it,  can  even  be  conceived  as  good  without 
qualification,  i.  e.,  as  absolutely  good,  except  a  good  will.1  Gifts 
of  fortune  or  of  nature,  such  as  health,  wealth,  intellect,  judgment, 
etc.,  are  not  good  in  themselves.  We  can  conceive  them,  as  they 
often  are,  perverted  to  the  basest  purposes.  At  the  very  best,  they 
are  but  as  the  setting  that  holds,  and  perhaps  displays  to  better  ad- 
vantage, the  gem;  but  the  gem  would  be  a  gem  independently  of 
them,  because  of  its  own  intrinsic  worth.  And  the  only  thing  that 
has  moral  worth  is  a  good  will,  and  no  act  has  moral  value  that  is 
done  from  any  other  motive  than  that  of  the  right.  Duty  must  be 
for  duty's  sake.  There  must  not  be  the  least  admixture  of  advant- 
age or  pleasure  or  any  material  consideration  or  sensuous  element  in 
it.  It  cannot  proceed  from  an  affection  of  the  sensibility.  It  must  be 
solely  self-determined  by  reason.  A  kind  act  done  by  a  person  na- 
urally  amiable  has  less  moral  worth  than  that  of  a  person  of  colder 
temperament  who  acts  solely  out  of  respect  for  the  law.2 

It  is  this  that  gives  Kant's  ethics  their  ascetic  character,  in  their 
severe  austerity,  their  renunciation  of  every  element  of  pleasure. 
Every  act  must  proceed  purely  out  of  reverence  for  the  moral  law.  In 
the  antagonism  between  duty  and  inclination  lies  the  essence  of  the 
moral  law. 

This  law  is  stated  as  follows,  in  what  Kant  calls  the  categorical 
imperative?  as  distinguished  from  the  hypothetical  imperative  which 
is  dependent  upon  some  condition  of  happiness: — "So  act  as  to  be 
perfectly  willing  that  the  maxim  (subjective  principle)  of  your  act 
become  a  law  of  the  universe."4  The  test  of  an  action  is  its  univer- 
sality. Kant  proceeds  immediately  to  apply  this  to  such  actions  as 
stealing,  lying,  suicide,  etc.  These  are  wrong  because  they  cannot  be 
universally  applied  without  defeating  themselves;  they  would  do 
away  with  property,  with  the  making  of  promises,  etc.,  and  are 
therefore  inconsistent  with  themselves;  and  it  is  on  these  grounds 
that  Kant  rejects  them  as  immoral — though  it  is  just  here  that  Kant 
comes  in  for  the  greatest  criticism  on  the  part  of  Hegel,  Schopen- 

1  Met.  of  Morals,  t  runs.,  p.  9. 

2  Ibid,  p.  14. 

3  Ibid,  p.  31. 

4  Ibid,  p.  39. 


EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS 

43 

hauer,  Bradley,  Caird  ■  and  others.  The  fact  that  an  act  is  to  be 
consistent  with  itself,  it  is  shown,  does  not  give  it  any  moral  content. 
Kant's  method  is  mere  formalism.  Out  of  the  abstract  idea  of  law, 
i.  e.,  out  of  the  idea  of  self-consistency,  no  particular  rules  or  laws  of 
action  can  be  developed.  The  abstract  universal  is  barren;  it  does 
not  differentiate  itself.  In  the  sphere  of  practice  no  less  than  in 
the  sphere  of  theory,  the  formal  laws  of  identity  and  contradiction 
are  merely  negative  criteria  of  truth.  The  bare  idea  of  universality, 
in  which  we  abstract  from  all  particulars,  cannot  help  us  to  reach 
any  particular  moral  determination,  to  the  exclusion  of  all  others. 
Hegel  maintains  that  reason,  guided  by  the  formal  principle  of  uni- 
versality, can  as  little  select,  as  it  can  suggest,  the  particular  rules 
of  action.  If  we  abstract  from  everything  but  itself,  we  can  univer- 
salize any  particular  rule  without  contradiction.  Kant's  demonstra- 
tion, for  example,  is  self-contradictory,  begs  the  question.  It  presup- 
poses that  right  of  property  which,  at  the  same  time,  it  denies.  Every 
rule  thus  universalized  would  result  in  a  contradiction.  (Bradley 
finely  shows  that  the  essence  of  morality  is  a  similar  contradiction. 
"Negate  the  sensuous  self."  But  if  the  sensuous  self  is  negated,  the 
possibility  of  morality  disappears.  Morality,  on  Kant's  principle,  is 
thus  as  inconsistent  as  theft.  "Succor  the  poor"  both  negates  and 
presupposes  poverty.  If  you  are  to  love  your  enemies,  you  must 
never  be  without  them :  and  yet  you  try  to  get  rid  of  them.  Is  that 
consistent?  In  short,  every  duty  which  presupposes  something  to 
be  negated,  is  no  duty:  it  is  an  immoral  rule,  because  self-contra- 
dictory.)2 Kant's  way  of  connecting  the  principle  with  the  par- 
ticular rules  of  morality  seems  to  involve  that  each  such  rule  should 
be  treated  as  in  itself  universal,  absolute.  But  in  morality  there  can 
only  be  one  absolute.  Treated  as  universal,  two  such  commands  as 
"thou  shalt  not  steal"  and  "thou  shalt  not  kill"  must  ultimately  come 
into  collision  with  each  other,  for  if  all  other  interests  are  to  be  post- 
poned to  the  maintenance  of  the  rights  of  property  it  is  impossible 
that  all  other  interests  should  be  postponed  to  the  preservation  of 
human  life.  To  make  either  property  or  life  as  absolute  end  is  to 
raise  a  particular  into  a  universal.  The  true  moral  vindication  of 
each  particular  can  be  found  only  in  determining  its  place  in  relation 
to  the  others,  in  a  complete  system  of  morality.    The  different  inter- 

1  Vol.  II.,  Chap.  II. 

2  Bradley,  Ethical  Studies,  p.  140. 


44  EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS. 

ests  must  alternately  give  place  to  each  other,  becoming  in  turn 
means  and  end,  in  the  one  moral  life  which  manifests  itself 
in  them  all. 

Kant's  pure  law  of  reason  becomes  an  abstract  universal,  i.  e., 
a  universal  opposed  to  any  and  every  particular.  But  it  is  only  its 
relation  to  the  particular  that  gives  to  the  universal  any  meaning. 
The  attempt  to  find  a  content  for  it  within  itself  ends  in  depriving 
it  of  all  content.  Kant  forgets  that  a  negative  implies  a  positive, 
and  a  negative  treated  merely  as  a  negative  is  no  relation  at  all,  is 
nothing. 

The  progress  of  the  moral  consciousness  is  the  transformation 
of  that  matter  which  in  its  earliest  stage  it  receives  into  itself,  its 
negation  and  its  reconstitution.  Man  as  a  "natural  spirit"  is  in  con- 
tradiction with  himself.  The  waking  of  self-consciousness  is  the  dis- 
tinction of  himself  from  his  own  natural  individuality,  and  carries 
with  it  the  consciousness  of  a  good  or  end  in  which  not  only  the  de- 
sires, but  the  self,  shall  be  satisfied ;  i.  e.,  the  satisfaction  of  the  desires 
is  brought  under  the  form  of  a  satisfaction  of  self.  Kant  neglects 
this  in  his  extreme  opposition  of  the  self  as  active  -to  that  self  as 
determined  by  particular  desires.  The  ideal,  the  consciousness  of 
which  arises  out  of  this  opposition,  cannot  be  absolutely  alien  to  the 
desires,  any  more  than  the  knowing  self  can  be  alien  to  the  particular 
objects  which  exist  only  for  it.  In  fact,  the  relation  in  which  these 
desires  are  brought  to  the  unity  of  the  Conscious  Self  in  its  being 
opposed  to  them,  is  already  the  first  step  in  the  way  of  making  ex- 
plicit the  ideal  involved  in  them;  and  thus  the  antagonism  of  desire 
and  duty  can  only  be  understood  in  relation  to  a  unity  which  is  pre- 
supposed in  that  antagonism,  and  which  is  realizing  itself  through  it. 
The  opposition  represents  the  transition. 

Kant  is  obliged  to  bring  in  utilitarian  l  considerations  in  apply- 
ing his  principle  of  universal  law.  He  does  not  succeed  in  leaving 
out  the  consideration  of  human  happiness  altogether.  "Both  in  form, 
and  by  every  one  of  the  examples  employed  in  illustration,  the  tests 
of  right  conduct  and  the  law  of  duty  are  found  by  Kant  in  the  effects 
of  conduct,  or  in  the  tendencies  of  conduct  to  affect  human  well-being, 
and  that  the  euphemistic  phrases  of  the  fitness  of  a  rule  to  become  a 

1  Cfc   Mill,  Utilitarianism,   p.  6.     "A  plump  descent  into   selfish   utilitarian- 
ism," Porter,  p.  78;  p.  76. 


EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS. 

universal  law  can  signify  nothing  less  than  the  tendencies  of  conduct 
with  respect  to  individual  and  social  welfare"  l 

"Kant  reasons  well,"  says  Porter,2  "when  he  reasons  that  cer- 
tain sensibilities,  such  as  might  be  supposed  peculiar  to  human  beings, 
are  in  no  sense  essential  to  moral  responsibility,  e.  g.,  some  of  the 
human  appetites  or  tastes,  such  as  are  dependent  on  the  body  or  the 
special  physiological  constitution  of  the  human  race.  But  Kant 
reasons  incorrectly  when  he  excludes  as  accidents  of  humanity  and 
as  non-essential  to  the  discernment  and  enforcement  of  the  moral  law, 
every  species  of  sensibility  whatever  as  the  possible  subject  of  ra- 
tional discrimination  and  moral  relationship."  The  satisfaction  of 
desire  through  the  satisfaction  of  self  changes  its  character. 

Rational  being  determines  itself  by  its  own  nature,  therefore 
makes  its  own  being  its  end.  Kant's  teaching  is  here  more  concrete. 
The  imperative  of  practical  reason  is,  "Always  treat  humanity,  in 
your  own  person  and  in  the  person  of  others,  as  an  end,  never  as  a 
means."  3  Each,  moreover,  should  seek  so  far  as  in  him  lies,  to  fur- 
ther the  ends  of  the  other :  for  the  ends  of  a  conscious  subject  must, 
as  far  as  possible,  become  my  ends.  Here  Kant  passes  from  the 
abstract  universal  to  the  universal  as  realized  in  the  individual.  This 
leads  to  the  conception  of  a  kingdom  of  ends,  which  is  a  social  com- 
munity of  beings  each  of  whom  is  reciprocally  end  and  means  to  the 
other.  "Act  in  conformity  with  the  idea  that  the  will  of  every  ra- 
tional being  is  a  universally  legislative  will."  4  The  kingdom  of 
ends  involves  the  idea  of  the  organic  unity  of  rational  beings,  but  the 
idea  is  not  fully  worked  out  in  Kant. 

According  to  Kant,  human  society  can  never  be  known  as  organic 
though  the  idea  of  it  as  an  organism  underlies  all  ethical  life.  The 
kingdom  of  ends  is  possible  as  a  moral  principle,  or  "typos,"  which 
commands  us  to  do  our  part  in  realizing  it ;  but  we  can  never  expect 
to  find  it  realized  in  experience.  However,  the  "ought-to-be"  will 
spring  out  of  a  deeper  appreciation  of  that  which  "is." 

The  opposition  between  inclination  and  duty  in  which,  according 
to  Kant,  the  very  essence  of  morality  lies,  must  be  made  consistent 

1  Porter,  p.  76.    Also  p.  149;  p.  127;  p.  125;  p.  78  ff.     Cf   "Virtue  as  worthy 
of  happiness."  Critique  of  Prac.  R.,  trans.,  p.  216  ff;  p.  157. 

2  Porter,  p.  82. 

3  Met.  of  Morals,  trans.,  p.  47. 

4  C.  of  Pr.  Reason,  trans.,  p.  119. 


46  EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS. 

with  the  doctrine  that  all  our  desires  are  desire  for  the  good,  i.  e., 
an  object  adequate  to  the  self. 

It  has  been  said  of  Kant's  "Will,"  that  it  is  "a  will  that  wills 
nothing,"1  that  it  is  merely  formal.  "To  act,"  says  Bradley,2  "you 
must  will  something  and  something  definite.  Duty  for  duty's  sake 
is  false  and  impossible.    We  know  not  duty  but  duties." 

The  permanent  value  of  Kant's  ethics,  and  that  which  consti- 
tutes their  characteristic  distinctiveness,  is  the  emphasis  which  he  lays 
upon  the  opposition,  the  essential  antagonism,  between  spirit  and 
nature  in  the  moral  life.3  It  is  this  which  gives  them  their  ascetic 
and  even  severely  austere  character. 

1  JacobI,  quoted  by  Caird,  Vol.  II.,  p.  216,  note. 

2  Kthical  Studies,  pp.  138-140. 

3  Caird,  Vol.  II.,  p.  196. 


EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS 

47 

CHAPTER  V. 


SUMMARY    AND    CRITICISM. 

Having  studied  the  essential  facts  in  both  evolutionism  and 
idealism,  to  what  conclusion  are  we  driven?  What  indeed  are  the 
distinguishing  facts  in  each  system  % 

The  distinguishing  facts  in  evolutionism  are,  (lst)  that  the  mor- 
al sense  is  looked  upon  as  a  product  of  evolution,  as  derived;1  whether 
through  sympathy  (Sutherland,  Darwin),  or  sociality  (Kropotkin), 
or  sociality  plus  intelligence  (Darwin),  or  justice  (Huxley,2  Kropot- 
kin), or  striving  of  social  organism  for  efficiency  (Leslie  Stephen),  or 
through  experiences  of  utility  together  with  political,  social  and  re- 
ligious restraints  (Spencer,  Sutherland) :  it  is  essentially  hetero- 
nomous. 

(2nd)  That  morality  is  relative,  in  the  sense  that  it  is  regarded 
as  a  mere  means  3  of  race  preservation  (Sutherland),  or  "quantity  of 
life"  (Spencer),  or  social  welfare  (Stephen),  or  of  further  evolution 
(Darwin). 

(3rd)  That  its  end  is  happiness,  proximate  or  remote,  pleasure 
in  some  form  (Spencer)  ;  utility,  efficiency,  "health  of  the  social 
tissue"  (Stephen)  ;  vitality  of  the  organism,  individual  or  social  wel- 
fare.    Its  imperative  is  the  hypothetical  imperative. 

Its  origin  is  society,  its  sanction  is  utility,  its  criterion  is  pleasure 
or  fitness  to  promote  the  general  happness,  its  authority  is  law,  cus- 
tom, religion,  public  opinion,  etc.4 

Idealism,  on  the  contrary,  looks  upon  the  moral  sense  as 
(lst)  underivedy  or  solely  derived  from,  or  inherent  in,  reason;  self- 
determined,  original,  sui  generis,  inexplicable  by  any  account  of  pure- 
ly natural  processes,  above  nature  5  and  even  contrary  to  nature  ;6  as 
distinct  from  intelligence  :7  it  is  autonomous. 

(2nd.)  Morality  is  absolute,  an  end  in  itself,  done  purely  for  the 
sake  of  the  law,  without  any  other  motive  or  intention,  the  least  ad- 
mixture of  which  vitiates  its  character  as  moral.  Its  imperative  is 
the  categorical  imperative. 

1  Fiske,  O.  of  C.  E.,  Vol.  II.,  P-  327. 

2  Evolution  and  Ethics,  "justice  of  the  pack,     P •  ^  m 

3  Schurman    I    of  D..  p.  125.     Martineau,  T.  of  E.  T.,  Vol.  II.,  p.  <>04 

4  ritimSJlv  with  Spencer  the  "intrinsic  effects"  of  actions.  Cf.  supra,  Chap. 
II.,    p.    17. 

5  Martineau. 

6  Huxley.  - 

7  Schurman,  I.  of  D.,  p.  147  ff. 


48  EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS. 

(3rd.)  So  far  from  happiness  or  any  form  of  pleasure  being  the 
end,  the  essence  of  the  moral  consists  in  its  antagonism  to  inclination. 
It  is  not  utility  or  efficiency,  for  a  good  will  is  good  not  for  what 
it  effects  but  for  what  it  intends,  even  when  it  fails  to  accomplish 
its  purposes.1 

Its  origin  is  reason,  its  criterion  is  its  universality,  its  motive  is 
reverence  for  the  law,  its  authority  is  the  rational  self-legislating  will. 

Evolutionary  theories  of  the  origin  of  morality  do  not  seem  to 
account  adequately  for  the  facts  they  attempt  to  describe.  That 
which  constitutes  the  very  essence  of  the  moral,  the  unique  character 
of  the  sense  of  duty,  the  "oughtness  of  the  ought,"  is  left  unexplained 
on  all  purely  naturalistic  theories  however  ingenious.  Sutherland,  for 
instance,  makes  morality  synonymous  with  sympathy, — but  morality, 
as  generally  understood,  is  a  wholly  different  and  far  wider  2  thing 
than  sympathy;  nor  does  sympathy  even  constitute  the  characteristic 
feature  of  morality.  According  to  Kant  they  are  diametrically  op- 
posed. Sutherland's  identification  of  morality  with  sympathy  is  a 
view  against  which  Kant's  conception  of  duty  and  the  essential 
nature  of  morality  would  be  fundamentally  opposed.  With  Kant 
actions  done  out  of  love  possess  no  moral  worth  whatever,  even 
though  virtuous  in  themselves.  The  following  words  seem  par- 
ticularly applicable  to  Sutherland.  "It  is  a  very  beautiful  thing  to 
do  good  to  men  from  love  to  them  and  from  sympathetic  good-will 
or  to  be  just  from  love  of  order :  but  this  is  not  the  true  moral  maxim 
of  conduct  which  is  suitable  to  our  condition  among  rational  beings, 
as  men,  when  we  pretend  with  fanciful  pride  to  set  ourselves  above 
the  thought  of  duty,  like  volunteers ;  and,  as  if  we  were  independent 
of  the  commands,  to  want  to  do  of  our  own  pleasure  what  we  think 

we  need  no  command  to  do."3 "Duty  and  obligation  are  the 

only  names  that  we  must  give  to  our  relations  to  the  moral  law."4 
Far  from  morality  being  synonymous  with  sympathy,  "It  is  practical 
love  and  not  pathological,  a  love  which  is  seated  in  the  will  and  not 
in  the  propensions  of  sense :  in  principles  of  action  and  not  of  tender 
sympathy;  and  it  is  this  love  only  which  can  be  commanded."5 

As  Mackintosh  very  pertinently  remarks,  "It  is  easy  to  show 
that  morality  is  an  outgrowth  of  sympathy  if  you  define  what  is 

1  Kant,  M.   of  M.,  trans.,   p.   10. 

2  Kropotkin,  p.  12.     Cf.  supra,  Chap.  III.,  p.  39. 

3  Critique  of  Pr.  R.,  trans.,  p.  175. 

4  Ibid. 

5  Ibid,  p.  178. 


EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS 

49 

'moral'  as  equivalent  to  what  is  sympathetic."1  You  merely  get  out 
what  you  put  in:  and  this  criticism  may  be  applied  to  all  evolu- 
tionary accounts  of  the  origin  of  the  moral  sense;  they  virtually 
presuppose  what  they  endeavor  to  explain ;  under  the  name  of  "sym- 
pathetic" or  "social"  or  "intelligent"  they  slip  in  the  moral  element 
and  then  pretend,  or  even  deceive  themselves  in  believing,  that  they 
have  deduced  it  independently,  by  simply  allowing  ages  for  its 
evolution.  But  in  every  case,  it  is  the  moral  with  which  they  start. 
Writers  like  Westermarck  and  Hobhouse  trace  the  evolution  of 
ethical  ideas,  but  merely  as  they  find  them  already  existing  in  society  : 
and  those  who  endeavor  to  go  back  of  them  and  account  for  the 
moral  instinct  itself  as  due  to  sociability  in  animals  combined  with 
the  growth  of  intelligence,  or  to  a  variation  due  to  natural  selection 
(which  in  this  case  would  be  nothing  short  of  marvelous  itself,  and 
itself  in  greatest  need  of  explanation)  set  themselves  the  impossible 
task  of  deriving  the  moral  from  the  unmoral.  By  no  such  con- 
jurer's trick,  by  no  such  mixing,  however  skillful,  of  the  ingredients 
of  "intelligence,"  "sympathy,"  "social  instincts,"  "justice  of  the 
pack,"  etc.,  in  any  witches'  cauldron  of  evolutionism  can  you  pro- 
duce the  phenomenon  which  we  term  the  moral  consciousness  in  man, 
with  its  sense  of  duty,  its  feeling  of  obligation,  its  authoritativeness 
of  conscience,  the  special  and  unique  character  of  which  none  of 
these  theories  succeed  adequately  in  describing,  let  alone  satisfac- 
torily accounting  for.  The  "rules"  set  up  by  social  opinion  are  not 
really  moral  at  all,  but  merely  instructions  how  to  reach  the  end 
happiness.  They  have  no  more  ethical  authority,  says  Martineau, 
than  the  receipts  of  a  cook-book!2 

Moreover,  as  Huxley  has  so  well  remarked,  if  the  moral  senti- 
ments have  been  derived,  "the  immoral  sentiments  have  been  no  less 
evolved,"  and  there  is  as  much  justification,  i.  e.,  "natural  sanction," 
for  the  one  as  for  the  other.  "Cosmic  evolution  may  teach  us  how 
the  good  and  the  evil  tendencies  of  man  may  have  come  about,  but 
in  itself,  it  is  incompetent  to  furnish  any  better  reason  why  what 
we  call  good  is  preferable  to  what  we  call  evil  than  we  had  before." 
The  good  does  not  derive  its  sanction  from  being  the  result  of  natural 
development.  On  the  contrary,  the  moral  seems  to  be  a  something 
in  contradiction  with  the  whole  course  of  merely  natural  develop- 
ment, over   against  it,  regulating  it,  mitigating  it,   and  that,  too, 

1  Fr.  C.  to  K.,  p.  180. 

2  T.  of  E.  T.,  Vol.  II,  p.  353. 


50 


EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS. 


not  instinctively  but  consciously,  "Social  progress  means  a  check- 
ing of  the  cosmic  process  at  every  step  and  the  substitution  for  it 
of  another  which  may  be  called  the  ethical  process."  l  That  which 
restrains  nature  must  surely  be  above  nature,  different  from  it  and 
independent  of  it.  As  Green  says  of  the  principle  of  knowledge, 
"how  can  that  explain  nature  which  is  a  product  of  nature" ; 2  and, 
similarly,  how  can  that  which  sets  itself  in  opposition  to  nature  and 
restrains  and  alters  and  moulds3  nature  be  itself  a  product  of  nature  ? 
Furthermore,  "To  a  being  who  is  simply  a  result  of  natural  forces, 
an  injunction  to  conform  to  their  laws  is  unmeaning";4  and  yet  all 
evolutionists  accept  the  validity  of  the  moral  law,  and  are  bound 
and  hold  others  bound  by  the  same  moral  laws  that  govern  the  con- 
duct of  other  men.  Why  man  should  obey  any  moral  law5  whatever 
its  origin,  why  he  should  feel  himself  constrained  or  restrained, — in 
which  lies  the  very  essence  of  the  "ought,"  or  the  sentiment  of 
responsibility  and  of  duty,  which  is  wholly  different  from  any  feel- 
ing of  sympathy  or  affectionateness  or  any  reasoned  calculation  of 
justice, — is  the  very  thing  to  be  explained,  but  which  is  not  satis- 
factorily accounted  for  on  any  purely  naturalistic  origin  of  morals. 
The  moral  as  it  appears  in  man  is  absolutely  differ- 
ent from  anything  at  all  resembling  it  in  even  the  highest  animals. 
It  has  never  been  proved  that  animals  have  a  conscience,  or  that 
there  exists  in  them  any  moral  feeling  at  all.  The  chief  element 
in  man  is  his  consciousness,  and  his  consciousness  of  himself  as  a 
free  being.  Animals  may  be  conscious  but  they  are  not  self-con- 
scious.6 In  Kant's  language,  they  live  in  the  world  of  phenomena, 
not  of  noumena.  They  never  propose  any  ends  to  themselves,  pos- 
sess no  idea  of  motive,  are  not  guided  by  any  conscious  conception  of 
the  good,  but  act  wholly  from  feeling,  habit  and  instinct.  "We 
have  no  evidence  of  the  presence  in  'brutes'  of  such  an  intelligence 
as  that  which  forms  the  basis  of  our  knowledge  and  if  that  be 
absent,  there  can  properly  speaking  have  been  no  development  of  our 
mind  from  such  a  mind  as  theirs;"1 — much  less  of  our  ideas  of  mor- 

1  Evol.  and  Eth.,  p.  80.  Cf.  Martineau,  "Naturalizing  ethics  rather  re- 
verses the  idealising  process  which  rather  ethieises  nature."  (T.  of  E.  T.,  Vol. 
II.,  p.  424). 

2  Proleg.,  p.  11. 

3  Cf.  Alexander,  M.  O.  and  P.,  "whether  morality  may  not  throw  light  on 
the  development  of  the  lower  world,  as  that  development  on  morality,"  p.  15; 
also   p.   262. 

4  Green,  Proleg.,  p.  9.  "Consistent  evolutionist  must  abolish  practical  or 
prescriptive  part  altogether." 

5  See  note  4. 

6  Caird,  p.  183. 

7  Green,  p.  89. 


EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS.  „ 

ality  which,  according  to  the  evolutionist  view,  presuppose  mind,  con- 
sciousness being  one  of  the  most  important  factors  on  which  the 
evolutionist  relies  for  his  explanation  of  the  moral  from  the  feelings 
and  instincts  of  animals. 

Even  holding  to  the  naturalistic  explanation  of  the  rise  of  the 
moral  sentiments,  it  must  be  remembered  that  natural  processes  are 
not  merely  natural.  Behind  the  natural  processes,  behind  all  bi- 
ologic change  (as  will  later  be  shown),1  stands  an  Eternal  Mind, 
to  which  the  processes  are  organic,  and  which  realizes  itself  through 
them ;  and  through  which  alone  they  have  any  meaning,  or  are  even 
rendered  possible,  being  absolutely  dependent  upon  its  free,  crea- 
tive, intelligent  and  moral  activity.  "Human  action  is  only  ex- 
plicable by  the  action  of  an  eternal  consciousness,  which  uses  them 
as  its  organs  and  reproduces  itself  through  them."2  "This  conclu- 
sion can  in  no  wise  be  affected  by  any  discovery  or  (legitimately)  by 
any  speculation,  in  regard  either  to  the  relation  between  the  human 
organism  and  other  forms  of  animal  structure,  or  to  the  develop- 
ment of  human  intelligence  and  the  connection  of  the  lowest  stages 
with  the  higher  stages  of  the  intelligence  of  brutes.  If  there  is 
reason  for  holding  that  man,  in  respect  of  his  animal  nature,  is 
descended  from  'mere'  animals — animals  in  whom  the  functions  of 
life  and  sense  were  not  organic  to  the  eternal  or  distinctively  human 
consciousness — this  does  not  affect  our  conclusion  in  regard  to  the 
consciousness  of  which,  as  he  now  is,  man  is  the  subject;  a  conclu- 
sion founded  on  an  analysis  of  what  he  now  is  and  does."3 

Such  an  analysis  reveals  man  as  a  free  moral  agent.  "In  him- 
self, i.  e.,  in  respect  of  that  principle  through  which  he  at  once  is 
a  self  and  distinguishes  himself  as  such,  he  exerts  a  free  activity — 
an  activity  which  is  not  in  time,  not  a  link  in  the  chain  of  natural 
becoming,  which  has  no  antecedents  other  than  itself,  but  is  self- 
originated." 

"That  countless  generations  should  have  passed  away  during 
which  a  transmitted  organism  was  progressively  modified  by  reaction 
on  its  suroundings,  by  struggle  for  existence  or  otherwise,  till  its 
functions  became  such  that  an  eternal  consciousness  could  realize 
or  reproduce  itself  through  them— this  might  add    to    the    wonder 

1  See  below,  Chap.  VII. 

2  Green,   p.  86. 

3  Ibid,  p.  87. 


52  EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS. 

with  which  the  consideration  of  what  we  do  and  are  must  always  fill 
us,  but  it  could  not  alter  the  results  of  that  consideration  and  can- 
not affect  the  analysis  of  knowledge  on  which  we  found  the  theory 
of  a  free  or  self -conditioned  and  eternal  mind  in  man."1 

The  lower  cannot  explain  the  higher.  The  lower  is  itself 
explicable  only  in  its  bearing  on  and  relation  to  the  higher.2  Con- 
sciousness can  never  be  explained  by  anything  less  than  conscious- 
ness, nor  can  morality — which  according  to  the  evolutionists  them- 
selves is  dependent  upon  consciousness — exist  apart  from  free, 
rational  beings.  The  evolutionary  theories  do  not  bridge  the  chasm 
between  the  moral  and  the  unmoral.  "In  this  case,  as  in  many 
others,  development  means  transformation."3 

As  for  pleasure  being  the  end  of  action,  it  is  never  pleasure  as 
such  that  the  self  seeks,  but  pleasure  viewed  as  a  good  of  the  self, 
pleasure  as  related  to  the  conscious  self  in  furtherance  of  the  ends  of 
its  being.  The  motive  of  every  imputable  act  is  desire  of  personal 
good  in  some  form  or  other, — which  is  absolutely  different  from 
animal  want.  In  the  satisfaction  of  his  desire  a  man  seeks  the  satis- 
faction of  himself.  "That  view  for  which  we  plead,"  says  Green, 
"is  that  the  quality  of  the  absolutely  desirable  life  which  renders  it 
such  in  man's  thoughts,  is  that  it  shall  be  the  full  realization  of 
his  capacities;  that,  although  pleasure  must  be  incidental  to  such 
realization,  it  is  in  no  way  distinctive  of  it,  being  equally  incidental 
to  any  unimpeded  activity,  to  the  exercise  of  merely  animal  func- 
tions no  less  than  to  those  that  are  properly  human:  that,  although 
we  know  not  in  detail,  what  the  final  realization  of  man's  capacities 
would  be,  we  know  well  enough,  from  the  evidence  they  have  so 
far  given  of  themselves,  what  a  fuller  development  of  them  would 
be:  that  thus,  in  the  injunction  to  make  life  as  full  a  realization  as 
possible  of  human  capacities,  we  have  a  definiteness  of  direction 
which  the  injunction  to  make  life  as  pleasant  as  possible  does  not 
supply."4 

The  end  of  life  is  not  happiness,  but  self-realization  ;  even  though 
the  latter  should  involve  pain,  suffering  and  sacrifice.  "It  is  not 
the  realizedness  of  the  form  that  is  good,  but  the  realization  of  it."5 

1  Green,   p.   88. 

2  Ibid,  p.  83.  "The  constituent  elements  of  an  organism  can  only  be 
truly  and  adequately  conceived  as  rendered  what  they  are  by  the  end  realized 
thro'  the  organism." 

3  Mackintosh,  p.  123. 

4  Green,  p.  463  ff. 

5  Bradley,  E.  S.,  p.  133. 


EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS.  „ 

Fullest  realization  cannot  be  attained  by  one  man  except  in  so 
far  as  it  is  attained  by  all.1  He  cannot  think  of  himself  as  satisfied 
in  any  life  other  than  a  social  life.2  His  highest  good  is  "an  ideal 
of  a  perfect  life  for  himself  and  other  men,  as  attainable  for  him 
only  through  them,  for  them  only  through  him :  a  life  that  shall  be 
perfect,  in  the  sense  of  being  the  fulfilment  of  all  that  the  human 
spirit  in  him  and  them  has  the  real  capacity  or  vocation  of  becoming, 
and  which  (as  implied  in  its  being  such  fulfilment)  shall  rest  on 
the  will  to  be  perfect."  3 

1  Cf.    Spencer,    "No   one   can    be    perfectly    free,   moral    or    happy   till   all 
are  so."    (Soc.   Stat.,  p.  273.     See  below,  Chap.  VI.,  p.  57. 

2  Green,  p.  415. 

3  Ibid,  p.  419.     Also  Soc.  Stat.,  p.  255. 


EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS. 


CHAPTER  VI. 


CONVERGENCE. 

"Nothing  is  more  striking  at  the  present  time,"  writes  Profes- 
sor Alexander,1  "than  the  convergence  of  the  main  opposing  ethical 
theories — on  the  one  hand,  the  traditional  English  mode  of  thought, 
which  advancing  through  utilitarianism  has  ended  in  the  so-called 
evolutionary  ethics;  on  the  other,  the  idealistic  movement  which  is 
associated  with  the  German  philosophy  derived  from  Kant." 

This  convergence  he  finds  to  be  "not  of  course  the  mere  agree- 
ment in  practical  precepts,  which  are  only  the  data  of  the  science 
and  the  common  property  of  every  thinker;  nor  is  it  found  in 
those  ultimate  philosophical  principles  from  which  ethics  can  never 
be  kept  far  removed,  for  they  are  as  divergent  as  possible."  It  is 
rather  an  "agreement  in  spirit,  which,  though  often  impalpable,  is 
shown  both  in  general  method  and  in  certain  general  results  which, 
though  fundamental  for  ethics,  are  what  Bacon  calls  'media  axio- 
mata'  in  comparison  with  the  ultimate  first  principles  of  phil- 
osophy."2 

The  agreement  in  method  is  described  as  "consisting  in  an 
objectivity  or  impartiality  of  treatment,  which  we  understand  by  the 
'scientific'  habit  of  mind  and  are  apt  to  associate  with  the  study  of 
the  natural  sciences  because  natural  objects  make  fewer  appeals  to 
the  prejudices."3  This  scientific  treatment  he  further  defines  as 
"willingness  to  submit  to  examination  things  that  might  seem  to  the 
feelings  too  valuable  to  endure  the  desecration  of  analysis."4 

The  convergence  in  general  results  he  finds  "harder  to  define, 
but  some  measure  of  it  may  be  obtained  by  comparing  the  ideal- 
istic doctrine,  that  morality  is  a  common  good  realized  in  individual 
wills,  with  the  view  held  by  'the  evolutionist  Leslie  Stephen,'  that 
conduct  is  moral  according  as  it  contributes  to  social  vitality''  5 

The  result  which  evolution  has  reached,  "this  mutual  inter- 
connection of  a  man  and  his  society,  is  not  new;  it  was  part  of  the 
final  outcome  given  in  the  first  quarter  of  the  (nineteenth)  century 

1  m.  o.  &  P.,  p.  5. 

2  Ibid. 

3  Ibid. 

4  Ibid,   p.   6. 

5  Ibid. 


EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS. 

to  German  idealism  at  the  hands  of  Hegel,  who  took  Kant's  ab- 
stract formula  and  gave  it  body  and  life  by  treating  the  law  of 
morality  as  realized  in  the  institutions  of  society  and  the  state.  It 
is  in  this  concrete  social  form  that  idealism  has  been  transplanted 
into  England."  1 

What  Evolutionism  and  Idealism,  then,  in  spite  of  their  great 
and  fundamental  differences,  have  in  common,  is  their  scientific2 
and  social  character.  Both  are  scientific.  Both  look  upon  ethics  as 
a  science,  and  hold  that  the  truths  of  ethics  are  to  be  scientifically 
treated  and  established.  We  have  seen  how  this  was  the  aim  of  Spen- 
cer's ethical,  and  even  philosophical,  labors — to  put  ethics  upon  a 
"scientific  basis,"  to  find  for  the  highly  important  moral  laws,  the 
"regulative"  principles  of  society  (the  loss  or  even  the  impairment 
of  which  he  looked  upon  as  exceedingly  "disastrous")  a  philosophic 
foundation ; — the  "secularization  of  morals"  3  he  called  this,  and 
morality  thus  derived  "natural  morality"  in  contradistinction  to 
"supernatural."  The  dictates  of  the  moral  sentiments  had  to  be 
"interpreted  and  made  definite  by  science."  4  For  the  "innate  per- 
ceptions of  right"  to  serve  as  guides  of  conduct  they  must  be  "duly 
enlightened  and  made  precise  by  an  analytic  intelligence."  His 
ethics  are  "rational  ethics."  5 

In  Kant,  too,  we  find  explicitly  stated  the  need  and  desirability 
of  scientific  form  for  the  treatment  of  morality.  "Even  wisdom,"  he 
writes,  "which  otherwise  consists  more  in  conduct  than  in  knowledge 
yet  has  need  of  science  not  in  order  to  learn  from  it,  but  to  secure  for 
its  precepts  admission  and  permanence."  6 

According  to  Kant,  it  was  absolutely  necessary  to  set  forth 
moral  principles  in  a  scientific  form  as  well  as  to  critically  examine 
and  deduce  them  by  a  thorough-going  philosophical  analysis,  purely 
in  the  light  of  reason,  independent  of  feeling,  or  revelation,  or 
popular  unwillingness  to  engage  in  more  than  superficial  thought, 
or  any  other  consideration  whatever.  No  less  than  Spencer  he  was 
absolutely  convinced  of  the  need,  and  indeed  the  indispensableness, 
of    absolutely    objective    treatment.     He    even    thought    that    this 

2  Used'here.'not  as  contrasted  with  philosophical,  but  as  denoting  impar- 
tiality and  objectiveness  of  treatment  of  experience,  characteristic  of  botn 
science  and   philosophy   in   narrower   sense. 

3  D.  of  E.,  preface.     See  supra,  Chap.  II.,  p.  13. 

4  D.  of  E.,  Sec.  63. 

5  Ibid,  Sec.  105. 

6  M.  of  M.,  trans.,   p.  21. 


56  EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS. 

would  greatly  promote  the  observance  of  moral  commands,  when  they 
were  seen  to  be  not  arbitrary  or  something  externally  imposed,  but 
to  rest  on  highest  considerations  of  pure  abstract  reason. 

"Science  *  (critically  undertaken  and  methodically  directed)  is 
the  narrow  gate  that  leads  to  the  true  doctrine  of  practical  wisdom, 
if  we  understand  by  this  not  merely  what  one  ought  to  do,  but  what 
ought  to  serve  teachers  as  a  guide  to  construct  well  and  clearly  the 
road  to  wisdom  which  everyone  should  travel  and  to  secure  others 
from  going  astray.  Philosophy  must  always  continue  to  be  the 
guardian  of  this  science,  and  although  the  public  does  not  take  any 
interest  in  its  subtle  investigations,  it  must  in  the  resulting  doctrines 
which  such  an  examination  first  puts  in  a  clear  light."  2 

In  another  passage  he  says,  "If  there  is  no  genuine  supreme 
principle  of  morality  but  what  must  rest  simply  on  pure  reason, 
independent  on  all  experience,  I  think  it  is  not  necessary  even  to  put 
the  question  whether  to  exhibit  these  concepts  in  their  generality 
(in  abstracto)  as  they  are  established  a  priori  along  with  the  prin- 
ciples belonging  to  them,  if  our  knowledge  is  to  be  distinguished 
from  the  vulgar  and  to  be  called  philosophical."  3 

Such  a  rational  ethics,  as  distinguished  from  merely  popular 
precepts,  "a  metaphysic  of  morals"  is  "not  only  an  indispensable 
substratum  of  all  sound  theoretical  knowledge  of  duties,  but  is  at  the 
same  time  a  desideratum  of  the  highest  importance  to  the  actual 
fulfilment  of  their  precepts."  4 

Another  thing  which  the  Evolutionary  and  the  Idealistic  sys- 
tems have  in  common  is  their  recognition  and  emphasis  of  man  as 
related  to  his  fellows,  as  a  member  of  society.  Society,  in  the  view 
of  both  is  an  organism,  in  which  the  whole  is  dependent  upon  the 
parts,  and  the  part — the  individual — derives  his  true  character  only 
as  an  expression  of,  and  as  related  to,  the  whole.  "It  is  fundamental 
to  the  physical  view  of  morals  that  there  can  be  nothing  good  which 
does  not  contribute  to  moral  stability ;"  5 — to  the  help  or  vitality  of 
the  "social  tissue,"  as  Leslie  Stephen  calls  it.  Even  morality  itself, 
by  most  evolutionists,  is  looked  upon  but  as  a  means  to  this  end,  a 

1  Kant  does  not,  of  course,  mean  natural   science. 

2  C.  of  Pr.  R.,  trans.,  p.  262. 

3  M.  of  M.,  p.  26. 

4  Ibid,  p.  27. 

5  M.  O.  &  P.,  p.  166. 


EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS. 

product  of  natural  selection  because  of  its  special  fitness  to  promote 
the  social  welfare.  In  Kant  we  have  the  doctrine  of  the  Kingdom 
of  Ends  which,  as  we  have  seen,  is  a  social  community  in  which 
each  serves  as  reciprocally  means  and  end  to  the  others.  Each  being 
a  rational  being,  is  to  be  treated  by  every  other  rational  being  as 
such,  and  his  ends  are  to  be  respected  as  well  as  my  ends,  and  each 
should  seek,  so  far  as  in  him  lies,  to  further  the  ends  of  the  others. 
It  is  the  very  fitness  of  the  maxim  of  an  action  for  a  place  in  a  scheme 
of  universal  legislation  that  stamps  it  as  a  good  action.  Spencer  re- 
fers specifically  to  Kant's  dictum,  "Act  according  to  the  maxim  only, 
which  you  can  wish,  at  the  same  time,  to  become  a  universal  law," 
and  remarks,  "This  implies  the  thought  of  a  society  in  which  the 
maxim  is  acted  upon  by  all  and  universal  benefit  recognized  as  the 
effect."1  Of  the  evolutionists,  Spencer's  ethics  are  the  most  individ- 
ualistic, and  yet  they  are  marked  throughout  by  a  recognition  of  the 
claims  of,  and  the  duties  towards,  others.2  The  intimate  relation 
of  a  man  to  his  fellows  and  to  all  other  men  is  everywhere  brought 
out;  and  Spencer  even  maintains  that  "it  is  only  by  entire  fulfil- 
ment of  the  moral  law  (which  includes  social  obligations)  that  life 
can  become  complete."  Individual  perfection  is  dependent  upon 
social  perfection.  "The  co-existence  of  a  perfect  man  and  an  im- 
perfect society  is  impossible."3  In  his  own  fine  words,  "No  one  can 
be  perfectly  free  until  all  are  free;  no  one  can  be  perfectly  moral 
until  all  are  moral ;  no  one  can  be  perfectly  happy  until  all  are 
happy."4  The  philosophical  moralist  "treats  solely  of  the  straight 
man,  describes  how  the  straight  man  comports  himself;  shows  in 
what  relationship  he  stands  to  other  straight  men;  shows  how  a 
community  of  straight  men  is  constituted."5  Spencer's  ethics  are 
what  he  calls  Absolute  Ethics,  as  distinguished  from  Relative  Ethics, 
and  formulate  the  laws  of  "the  ideal  man  as  existing  in  the  ideal 
social  state."9 

Acording  to  Alexander,  morality  is  social  as  society  is  moral.7 
The  very  essence  of  goodness  is  "its  adjustment  to  the    order    of 

1  D.   of  E.,   Sec.   108. 

2  Soc.  Stat.,  p.  273. 

3  D.  of  E.,  Sec.  108. 

4  Soc.  Stat.,  p.  273. 

5  D.  of  E.,  Sec.  106. 

6  Ibid,  Sec.  108. 

7  M.  O.  &  P.,  p.  15. 


58  EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS. 

action,  its  compatibility  with  the  systematic  whole.     The  moral  sen- 
tence expresses  this  adjustment."1 

In  Green  the  social  character  of  morality  is  brought  out  still 
more  strongly.  The  end  which  a  rational  being  proposes  to  himself 
is  his  highest  good,  but  this  cannot  be  attained  apart  from  his  fel- 
lows in  society.2  The  divine  idea  of  man  can  only  be  fulfilled  in 
and  through  persons,  i.  e.,  in  and  through  society.  Without  society 
there  can  be  no  persons,  as  only  through  society  is  personality  actual- 
ized.3 Life  consists  in  continual  and  progressive  realization  on  the 
part  of  the  self,  but  this  self-realization  is  not  only  compatible  with, 
but  dependent  on,  the  like  realization  of  themselves  by  others.  There 
is  a  unity  of  the  human  spirit  throughout  its  individual  manifesta- 
tions, in  virtue  of  which  the  realization  of  its  possibilities,  though  a 
personal  object  to  each  man,  is  at  the  same  time  an  object  fully 
attainable  by  one  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  attained  by  the  whole  human 
society"*  ....  "The  spring  of  all  moral  progress  can  still  lie 
nowhere  else  than  in  the  attraction  of  heart  and  will  by  the  ideal 
of  human  perfection,  and  the  practical  convictions  which  arise 
from  it."5 

"Taking  human  society  together,  its  action  in  one  mode  sup- 
plements its  action  in  another,  and  the  whole  sum  of  its  action  forms 
the  motive  power  of  true  moral  development ;  which  means  the  appre- 
hension on  our  part,  ever  widening  and  ever  filling  and  ever  more 
fully  responded  to  in  practice,  of  our  possibilities  as  men  and  of  the 
reciprocal  claims  and  duties  which  those  possibilities  imply."6  .... 
"Do  what  is  best  for  mankind"  Green  uses  as  a  popular  equivalent 
of  Kant's  formula — "Treat  humanity,  whether  in  your  own  person 
or  in  that  of  another,  never  merely  as  a  means,  always  at  the  same 
time  as  an  end."7 

Thus  Evolutionism  and  Idealism  are  at  one  in  the  stress  they 
lay  upon  the  social  character  of  man's  nature  and  man's  duty. 

There  is  also  a  basis  of  approach  between  the  two  philosophies 
in  the  importance  each  attaches  to  the  family  as  the  birth-place  of 
moral  ideas.    According  to  Sutherland,  morality  is  "perihestic,"  i.  e., 

1  M.  o.  &  P.,  p.  148. 

2  Prole*?.,  p.  199. 

3  Ibid,  p.  200. 

4  Ibid,  p.  422. 

5  Ibid,  p.  341. 

6  Ibid,  p.  337. 

7  Ibid,  p.  342. 


EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS. 

originated  around  the  hearth-fires  of  primitive  man,  taking  its  rise 
in  parental  and  conjugal  love  and  filial  affection,  and  developing 
with  a  tender  regard  of  brother  and  sister  and  the  mutual  and 
reciprocal  offices  and  kindness  of  the  members  of  the  same  family- 
group.  With  Green,  too,  "the  form  in  which  true  good,  or  good  on 
the  whole,  was  first  conceived  was  that  of  family  well-being."1 
The  most  primitive  and  elementary  objects  that  could  supply  the 
soul's  demand  for  a  permanent  good  and  give  some  definite  content 
to  the  idea  of  true  good,  ....  "must  have  been  those  that  contribute 
to  supply  the  wants  of  a  family — to  keep  its  members  alive  and  com- 
fortably alive."2  In  providing  for  them  he  provides  for  himself. 
They  constitute  his  other  self.  His  own  life  is  caried  forward  in 
theirs.  This  provision  for  the  wants  of  a  family,  which  gives  its 
content  to  the  idea  of  good,  is  not  a  merely  instinctive  process.  It  is 
connected  with  the  good  will  and  rests  on  self-consciousness.  It  is 
"in  promise  and  potency  an  interest  in  the  bettering  of  mankind."3 
It  reveals  an  interest,  moral  and  spiritual,  different  from  the  mere 
satisfaction  of  animal  wants,  and  leading  to  the  conception  of  "that 
permanent  welfare  of  the  family,  which  it  was  their  great  object 
to  promote,  as  consisting,  at  any  rate  among  qther  things,  in  the 
continuance  in  others  of  an  interest  like  their  own;  in  other  words, 
as  consisting  in  the  propagation  of  virtue."4" 

Through  the  family,  then,  by  identifying  one's  permanent  good 
with  it,  and  the  care  and  cultivation  of  its  members,  there  has 
arisen  "a  conception  of  good  things  of  the  soul,  as  having  a  value 
distinct  from  and  independent  of  the  good  things  of  the  body;  if 
not  as  the  only  things  truly  good,  to  which  all  other  goodness  is 
merely  relative."  5 

1  Proleg.,  p.  246. 

2  Ibid,  p.  247;  p.  257. 

3  Ibid,  p.  258. 

4  Ibid,  p.  260. 

5  Ibid,  p.  261. 


60  EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS. 

CHAPTER  VII. 


RECONCILIATION. 

We  referred  above  1  to  Caird's  statement  of  the  "vital  opposi- 
tion which  has  affected  the  whole  history  of  Ethics,"  and  which  he 
finds  in  its  most  pronounced  form  in  Kant  as  contrasted  with  the 
hedonistic  philosophy.  This  opposition  we  have  endeavored  to  illus- 
trate as  revealed  in  the  two  antagonistic  systems  of  Evolutionism 
and  Idealism.  We  have  attempted  to  make  plain  the  characteristic 
distinctiveness  of  each,  and  our  study  has  emphasized  the  funda- 
mental contrasts  between  them.  Our  last  chapter  was  devoted  to 
setting  forth  some  of  the  points  which  they  nevertheless  have  in 
common,  such  as  their  scientific  and  social  character,  and  the  import- 
ance each  attaches  to  the  family  as  the  birth-place  of  moral  ideas. 

The  author  whom  we  have  above  quoted,  after  stating  that 
"each  side  represents  a  real  interest  of  the  moral  life,"  goes  on  to 
remark  that  "we  are  taking  up  the  consideration  of  it  at  a  stage  at 
which  the  antagonism  has  reached  its  ultimate  form,  and  therefore 
is  on  the  way  to  be  reconciled.'"2 

Kant  himself,  "though  he  expresses  the  negative  view  of  the 
moral  life  in  its  relation  to  sense  and  passion  in  no  hesitating  terms, 
yet  has  continually  present  to  him  the  necessity  of  a  reconciliation." 

This  reconciliation  is  found  in  the  higher  unity  which  embraces 
both  interests,  and  in  relation  to  which  alone  they  are  at  all  to  be 
understood.  The  ideal,  the  consciousness  of  which  arises  out  of  the 
opposition  of  self  as  active  from  that  self  as  determined  by  particular 
desires,  cannot  (as  has  been  shown  above)3  be  absolutely  alien  to 
the  desires,  any  more  than  the  knowing  self  can  be  alien  to  the 
particular  objects  which  exist  only  for  it.  In  fact,  the  relation 
in  which  these  desires  are  brought  to  the  unity  of  the  Conscious  Self 
in  its  being  opposed  to  them,  is  already  the  first  step  in  the  way  of 
making  explicit  the  ideal  involved  in  them.  The  antagonism  of 
desire  and  duty  can  only  be  understood  in  relation  to  a  unity  which 
is  presupposed  in  that  antagonism  and  which  is  realizing  itself 
through  it.     The  satisfaction  of  the  desires  is  brought  under  the 

1  Chap.  IV.,  p.  40. 

2  Vol.  II.,  p.  172. 

3  Chap.  IV.,  p.  44. 


EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS.  61 

form  of  a  satisfaction  of  self.  The  absolute  universal  of  Kant  be- 
comes the  concrete  universal  of  Hegel.  The  antagonism  becomes 
realization. 

To  quote  a  passage  from  Bradley,1  "The  universal  to  be  realized 
is  no  abstraction,  but  an  organic  whole,  a  system  where  many  spheres 
are  subordinated  to  one  sphere,  and  particular  actions  to  spheres.  This 
system  is  real  in  the  detail  of  its  function,  not  out  of  them,  and  lives 
in  its  vital  processes,  not  away  from  them.  The  organs  are  always 
at  work  for  the  whole,  the  whole  is  at  work  in  the  organs.  And  I 
am  one  of  the  organs.  The  universal,  then,  which  I  am  to  realize  is 
the  system  which  penetrates  and  subordinates  to  itself  the  particulars 
of  all  lives,  and  here  and  now  in  my  life  has  this  and  that  function, 
in  this  and  that  case,  in  exercising  which  through  my  will  it  realizes 
itself  as  a  whole,  and  me  in  it." 

There  is  a  Good  Will  in  the  world  realizing  itself  through 
human  wills,  through  mankind,  through  society,  through  history, 
through  nature ;  using  all  things  as  its  organs,  through  which  it  ex- 
presses itself,  and  as  its  instruments,  though  which  it  accomplishes 
its  purposes.  "The  good-will  in  the  world  realizes  itself  by  and  in 
imperfect  instruments,  and  in  spite  of  them."  2 

The  deepest  analysis  of  the  phenomena  of  life  and  of  human 
consciousness,  and  of  the  process  we  call  knowing,  reveals  in  man  the 
presence  of  a  "principle  not  natural,"  3  a  "spiritual"  4  or  "divine  5 
principle"  which  is  a  part  or  a  manifestation  of  an  Eternal  Con- 
sciousness 6  or  Mind  7  or  Spirit  realizing  itself  in  the  self-conscious- 
ness of  man,  in  his  self-conscious  and  free  activity  and  effort  after 
continual  improvement,  mental,  material  and  moral;  whose  realiza- 
tion constitutes  its  own  rational,  self-conscious  end,8  for  which  it 
uses  every  material,  natural  and  human  agency.9 

This  good-will,  in  constant  progress  of  self-realization,  on  its 
scientific  side  we  call  Evolution,  with  whose  process  we  identify  it. 

"The  slowly  wrought-out  dominance  of  Mind  in  things  is  the 
central  fact  of  evolution ;"— so  writes  Hobhouse,10  one  of  the  latest 

1  Ethical  Studies,  p.  159. 

2  Ibid,  p.  165. 

3  Green,  p.  14. 

4  Ibid,  Chap.  I. 

5  Ibid,  p.  188. 

6  Ibid,  p.  72;  p.  86. 

7  Ibid,  p.  87. 

9  Cf^JcJb  S"  v.  8,   "There  is  a  spirit  in  man,  and  the  breath  of  the  Al- 
mighty giveth  them  understanding." 

10  Morals  in  Evolution,  Vol.  II.,  p.  284. 


62  EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS. 

writers  on  the  evolution  of  morals;  and  this  is  the  conclusion  to 
which  he  comes  after  a  most  careful  study  of  the  facts  of  evolution 
and  their  application  to  the  origin  and  development  of  morality, 
treated  historically  and  scientifically.  He  reaches  the  idea  of  "a 
self-conscious  evolution  of  humanity,"  and  finds  therein  "a  mean- 
ing and  an  element  of  purpose  for  the  historical  process  which  has 
led  up  to  it."  For  him  the  whole  "plan"  of  evolution  implies  a 
"planning"  Mind.1  "For  progress,"  he  writes,  "is  not  something 
that  goes  on  of  itself  by  an  automatic  law,  or  an  inherent  tendency 

of  things There  remains  the  possibility,  however  difficult  to 

conceive  in  concrete  shape,  of  a  spirit  subject  to  conditions,  and 
achieving  its  full  growth  only  by  mastering  them.  .  .  .  Progress  is 
made  only  in  so  far  as  the  conditions  of  life  come  more  and  more 
under  the  dominion  of  Mind."  2 

As  Schurman  says,  in  criticism  of  Darwin's  view  that  morality 
is  but  a  product  of  highly  developed  intelligence;  "Were  intelli- 
gence not  at  the  heart  of  the  cosmos,  it  could  not  have  turned  up  as 
the  crowning  glory  of  the  development  of  life."  3  Huxley  in  his 
famous  Romanes  lecture  has  expressed  a  similar  idea.  "Fragile 
reed  as  he  may  be,  man,  as  Pascal  says,  is  a  thinking  reed ;  there  lies 
within  him  a  fund  of  energy,  operating  intelligently,  and  so  far  akin 
to  that  which  pervades  the  universe,  that  it  is  competent  to  influence 
and  modify  the  cosmic  process."  4 

So  far  from  the  knowledge  of  nature  being  itself  a  part  or  pro- 
duct of  nature,  there  is  a  sense  in  which  man  is  related  to  nature  as 
its  author,  as  well  as  its  child,5  through  the  presence  in  him  of  a 
principle  not-natural,  by  which  he  makes  his  world  of  experience 
through  the  unifying  power  of  consciousness,  (which  Kant  calls  "the 
synthetic  unity  of  apperception"  or  "understanding").  "The  under- 
standing makes  nature"  is  Kant's  celebrated  dictum.6  Spirit  cannot 
be  derived  from  "nature."  Nature,  as  a  "process  of  change"  is  ex- 
plicable only  through  spirit.7  Man  does  not  merely,  like  the  plant 
or  animal,  undergo  a  process  of  development,  but  seeks  to  and  does 

1  M.  in  E.,  Vol.   L,  p.  4,  footnote. 

2  Ibid,  Vol.  II.,  p.  280. 

3  I.  of  D.,  p.  146. 

4  E.  of  E.,  p.  83. 

5  Green,  p.  15. 

6  "Macht  zwar  der  Verstand  die  Natur  aber  er  schafft  sie  nicht,"   quoted 
by  Green,  p.  15. 

7  Green,  p.  37. 


EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS.  63 

develop  himself.1  "If  it  were  not  for  certain  demands  of  the  spirit 
which  is  our  self,  the  notion  of  human  progress  could  never  occur 
to  us." "It  is  the  consciousness  of  possibilities  in  ourselves  un- 
realized, but  constantly  in  process  of  realization,  that  alone  enables 
us  to  read  the  idea  of  development  into  what  we  observe  of  natural 
life,  and  to  conceive  that  there  must  be  such  a  thing  as  a  plan  of  the 
world."  2  The  very  idea  of  Evolution  and  the  discerning  of  a  Plan 
in  the  process  of  nature  is  a  spiritual  product,  a  manifestation  of 
Mind  or  Conscious  Intelligence. 

Evolution  is  but  the  mental  side  of  what  on  the  active  side  is 
self-realization. 

"Evolution,"  writes  Bradley,  "gives  us  over  neither  to  chance 
nor  alien  necessity,  for  it  is  that  self-realization  which  is  the  pro- 
gressive conquest  of  both."  3  ....  "If  'progress'  signifies  that  an 
advance  has  been  set  going  and  is  kept  up  by  chance  in  an  unknown 
direction:  that  the  higher  is,  in  short,  what  is  and  what  before  was 
not,  and  that  what  will  be,  of  whatever  sort  it  is,  will  still  be  a  step 
in  progress ;  if,  in  short,  the  movement  of  history  towards  a  goal  is 
mere  illusion,  and  the  stages  of  that  movement  are  nothing  but  the 
successes  of  what  from  time  to  time  somehow  happens  to  be  best 
suited  to  the  chance  of  circumstances, — then  it  is  clear,  in  the  first 
place,  that  teleology  being  banished,  such  words  as  evolution  and 
progress  have  lost  their  own  meaning,  and  that  to  speak  of  humanity 
realizing  itself  in  history,  and  of  myself  finding  in  that  movement 
the  truth  of  myself  worked  out,  would  be  simply  to  delude  oneself 
with  hollow  phrases."  4 

In  other  words,  if  Evolution  is  to  have  any  meaning  at  all,  it 
must  have  a  teleological  significance.  It  cannot  be  merely  blindly 
mechanical.  Only  in  the  light  of  ideal  considerations,  as  being  a 
process  of  self-conscious  self-realization,  is  it  at  all  rational  or  in- 
telligible. 

After  remarking  that  the  word  "evolution"  may  be  used  to  stand 
for  anything  whatever,  though  it  has  none  the  less  a  meaning  of  its 
own,  Bradley  continues,  "  'Evolution,'  'development,'  'progress,'  all 
imply  something  identical  throughout,  2.  subject  of  the  evolution, 

1  Green,  p.  182. 

2  Ibid,  p.  196. 

3  Ethical  Studies,  p.  172. 

4  Ibid,  p.  173. 


64  EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS. 

which  is  one  and  the  same.  If  what  is  there  at  the  beginning  is  not 
there  at  the  end,  and  the  same  as  what  was  there  at  the  beginning, 
then  evolution  is  a  word  with  no  meaning.  Something  must  evolve 
itself,  and  that  something,  which  is  the  end  must  also  be  the  begin- 
ning. It  must  be  what  moves  itself  to  the  end,  and  must  be  the  end 
which  is  the  'because'  of  the  motion.  Evolution  must  evolve  itself 
to  itself,  progress  itself  go  forward  to  a  goal  which  is  itself,  develop- 
ment bring  out  nothing  but  what  is  in,  bring  it  out,  not  from  external 
compulsion,  but  because  it  is  in." 

In  other  words — we  reach  the  same  conclusion — Mind  is  back  of 
all  evolution.  The  whole  evolutionary  process,  whether  in  nature 
or  in  morals,  posits  Mind, — a  purposive  intelligence,  a  di- 
recting force.  Evolution  is  not  a  mere  fortuitous  process, 
given  over  to  "accident,"  or  "necessity," — blind  chance  or 
meaningless  change.  It  implies,  and  indeed  exhibits,  orderly 
development ;  and,  moreover,  the  triumph  of  such  evolutionary  think- 
ers as  Spencer,  or  Darwin,  is  to  have  reduced  the  whole  process  to  law, 
and  to  have  discovered  the  formula,  or  the  "mechanism,"  of  develop- 
ment. That  which  reveals  the  omnipresence  of  law  in  every  particle  of 
material  creation,  from  protoplasm  to  highest  man,  cannot  itself  be 
without  law,  in  the  sense  of  being  lawless,  irrational.  On  the  con- 
trary, it  is  itself  the  ground  of  law,  the  basis  and  cause  of  rational 
procedure  and  development.  Evolution  does  not  so  much  explain 
Soul,  as  Soul  explains  evolution.  Evolution  without  soul  is  inex- 
plicable and  begs  the  question.  Soul  supplies  the  energizing  spring 
of  the  whole  evolutionary  process,  and  is  explicable, — self-explicable : 
the  very  definition  of  soul,  or  at  least  the  knowledge  of  it,  as  we  are 
conscious  of  it  in  ourselves,  implying  all  those  faculties  and  powers 
which  evolution  assumes  but  does  not  account  for.  Evolution  viewed 
from  the  highest  rational  standpoint,  and  on  the  only  theory  that  will 
adequately  explain  all  the  facts,  becomes  one  with  realization;1  is 
identical  with  the  self-conscious,  self-realization  of  the  Spirit  of  the 
universe. 

Applying  these  considerations  to  the  evolution  of  morals; — all 
that  evolutionary  thinkers  such  as  Darwin,  Sutherland,  and  Spencer 
have  said  as  to  the  naturalistic  origin  of  the  moral  sense  may  be 

1  "According  to  Hegel,"  says  Sidgwlck,  "the  essence  of  the  universe  is  a 
process  of  thought  from  the  abstract  to  the  concrete;  and  a  right  understand- 
ing of  this  process  gives  the  key  for  interpreting  the  evolution  in  time  of 
European  philosophy." — History   of  Ethics,  p.  280. 


EVOLUTIONISM     AND     IDEALISM     IN     ETHICS.  6. 

true,  without  invalidating  the  idealistic  character  of  ethics.  Even 
granted  that  our  criticism  has  not  been  valid,  and  that  the  feeling  of 
moral  obligation  and  the  sense  of  duty  may  have  indeed  arisen,  as 
these  writers  claim,  through  sympathy  and  sociality  and  intelligence, 
immensely  furthered  through  natural  selection,  together  with  later 
enactment  of  positive  law,  and  that  the  whole  process  may  be  ex- 
hibited in  unbroken  unity  from  lowest  animal  to  highest  man; — in 
the  light  of  what  has  been  set  forth  in  this  chapter  it  still  remains 
an  incontrovertible  fact,  that  evolution  at  the  most  merely  reveals  the 
historical  order  of  events  and  does  not  explain  their  intrinsic  char- 
acter, due  to  their  derivation  from  the  Ideal  Cause,  the  Ground  of 
the  Moral  Order  and  Moral  Progress  of  the  universe,  which  can  be 
nothing  else  than  Eternal  Reason,  realizing  itself  progressively  in 
time. 

There  is  a  moral  order  in  the  Universe.  The  cosmos  is  in- 
trinsically and  originally  moral,  founded  in  moral  as  in  natural  law, 
moral  in  purpose  and  in  essence. 

There  is  an  ideal  trend  to  our  nature.  There  are  facts  of  the 
moral  life  and  the  transcendent  character  of  duty,  feelings  and  aspir- 
ations and  motives  and  impulses  of  the  soul,  moral  instincts  in  short, 
which  no  merely  evolutionary  or  utilitarian  considerations  can  ade- 
quately explain,  which  defy  analysis  as  mere  products  of  hereditary 
hedonistic  forces.  The  sense  of  honor,  the  feeling  of  integrity,  the 
moral  sensitiveness  that  "feels  a  stain  like  a  wound,"  the  heroic  ethi- 
cal loyalty  that  "sweareth  to  its  own  hurt  and  changeth  not;"  all 
that  we  term  the  grandeur  of  righteousness  and  the  beauty  of  holi- 
ness : — these  things  are  beyond  any  mere  analysis  of  ethical  feeling  to 
explain,  they  transcend  any  and  every  merely  social  explanation  and 
justification.  They  have  their  sanction  in  a  higher  source,  viz.,  in 
their  idealistic  and  divine  origin.  Ethics,,  by  the  very  nature  and 
character  of  the  ethical,  demands  a  tkeistic,  at  least  an  idealistic, 
interpretation  of  the  universe  and  of  life. 

The  Evolutionary  account  of  the  origin  of  ethics  is  perhaps  cor- 
rect so  far  as  it  goes.  It  may  possibly  be  accepted  completely  as  a 
description  of  the  historical  process  in  time :  but  as  penetrating  to  the 
core  of  the  character  of  the  ethical,  as  revealing  the  full  worth  and 
grandeur  of  the  mor.al  instinct,  particularly  of  the  higher  forms  of 
duty,  it  falls  short  as  a  complete  satisfactory  account  that  shall  do 
full   justice   to  the   thing   attempted  to  be   explained.     The   latter 


66  EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM     IN    ETHICS. 

has  its  rational  and  full  comprehension  only  in  that  Ideal  Source 
whence  it  springs. 

Kant's  lofty  words  perhaps  convey  better  than  any  formal  state- 
ment, or  mere  scientific  declaration,  the  high  character  and  origin  of 
the  moral  sentiment : — 

"Duty!  Thou  sublime  and  mighty  name,  that  dost  embrace 
nothing  charming  or  insinuating,  but  requirest  submission,  and  yet 
seekest  not  to  move  the  will  by  threatening  aught  that  would  arouse 
natural  aversion  or  terror,  but  merely  holdest  forth  a  law  which  of 
itself  finds  entrance  into  the  mind,  and  yet  gains  reluctant  reverence 
(though  not  always  obedience),  a  law  before  which  all  inclinations 
are  dumb  even  though  they  secretly  counter-work  it!  What  origin 
is  there  worthy  of  thee,  and  where  is  to  be  found  the  root  of  thy 
noble  descent,  which  proudly  rejects  all  kindred  with  the  inclinations ; 
a  root  to  be  derived  from  which  is  the  indispensable  condition  of  the 
only  worth  which  men  can  give  themselves  f" 

"It  can  be  nothing  less  than  a  power  which  elevates  man  above 
himself  which  can  enable  a  man  to  appreciate  the  obligation  and  ele- 
vation of  such  a  life"  ....  "This  power,"  he  proceeds  to  say,  "is 
nothing  but  personality,  that  is,  freedom  and  independence  of  the 
mechanism  of  nature,  yet,  regarded  as  a  faculty  of  a  being  who  is 
subject  to  special  laws,  viz.,  pure,  practical  laws  given  by  its  own 
reason,  so  that  the  person  as  belonging  to  the  sensible  world,  is  sub- 
ject to  his  own  personality  as  belonging  to  the  intelligible  world."  l 

This  Power,  this  Personality,  this  Eternal  Reason,  is  what  both 
philosophy  and  common  speech,  as  well  as  religion,  unite  in  calling, 
and  in  reverencing  as, — God. 

"God,"  says  Green,  "is  not  merely  a  Being  who  has  made  us," 
but  "He  is  a  Being  in  whom  we  exist;  with  whom  we  are  in  prin- 
ciple one ;  with  whom  the  human  spirit  is  identical,  in  the  sense  that 
He  is  all  which  the  human  spirit  is  capable  of  becoming.' ' 2 

Even  according  to  Mr.  Spencer,  the  greatest  authority  on  Evo- 
lution, at  the  end  of  all  scientific  and  philosophic  inquiries,  we  are 
brought  into  the  presence  of  "an  infinite  and  omnipresent  Energy 
from  which  all  things  proceed."3 

"Science  and  philosophy,"  writes  Macpherson,  "long  divided  by 

1  Cr.  of  Pr.  R.,  trans.,  p.  189. 

-'  Troleg.,   p.  198. 

3  Macpherson,  Spencer  and  Spencerisin,  p.  90. 


EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS.  6? 

such  watchwords  as  Materialism  and  Idealism,  are  now  beginning  to 
unite  in  recognition  of  the  fact  that  Matter  is  not  dead,  inert,  but 
alive  and  everywhere  palpitating  with  energies,  and  that  organic 
life  is  no  special  creation,  but  simply  a  highly  specialized  and  com- 
plex form  of  the  universal  life  of  Nature.  So  far  from  Mr.  Spencer 
being  a  Materialist,  he  might  more  correctly  be  described  as  an 
Idealist.  So  far  from  thinking  that  life  is  a  product  of  Matter,  he 
has  clearly  indicated  that  in  his  view  Matter  itself  is  a  form  of  life. 
In  his  own  words:  'Under  one  of  its  aspects,  scientific  progress  is 
a  gradual  transfiguration  of  Nature.  Where  ordinary  perception  saw 
perfect  simplicity,  it  reveals  great  complexity;  where  there  seems 
absolute  inertness  it  discloses  intense  activity;  and  in  what  appears 
mere  vacancy  it  finds  a  marvellous  play  of  forces.  Each  generation 
of  physicists  discovers  in  so-called  "brute-matter"  powers  which  but 
a  few  years  before  the  most  instructed  physicists  would  have  thought 
incredible.  When  the  explorer  of  nature  sees  that,  quiescent  as  they 
appear,  surrounding  solid  bodies  are  thus  sensitive  to  forces  which 
are  infinitesimal  in  their  amounts — when  the  spectroscope  proves  to 
him  that  molecules  on  the  earth  pulsate  in  harmony  with  molecules  in 
the  stars — When  there  is  forced  on  him  the  inference  that  every  point 
in  space  thrills  with  an  infinity  of  vibrations  passing  through  it  in 
all  directions ;  the  conception  to  which  he  tends  is  much  less  that  of  a 
universe  of  dead  matter  than  that  of  a  universe  everywhere  alive; 
alive,  if  not  in  the  restricted  sense,  still  in  the  general  sense.'  " 

Thus  even  Herbert  Spencer,  High-priest  of  Science,  and  Arch- 
materialist  though  he  is  supposed  to  be,  prefers,  and  is  philosophic- 
ally led,  to  interpret  the  universe  in  terms  of  spirit  rather  than  of 
matter.  So  also  Wallace,  co-discoverer  with  Darwin  of  the  origin  of 
species  through  natural  selection,  reaches  the  conclusion  "that  the 
whole  universe  is  not  merely  dependent  on,  but  actually  is  the  will  of 
higher  intelligence,  or  of  one  Supreme  Intelligence."  l 

With  such  views  as  the  foregoing,  philosophy  is  no  longer  mere- 
ly philosophy.  It  has  become  religion.  Ethics,  through  metaphy- 
sics, has  "passed  on"  2  to  religion.  Morality  "issues  in,"  3  and  there- 
after "survives  within,"  4  religion.  Evolution  becomes  immanent 
teleology. 

1  Quoted  by  Williams,   R.   of  E.   E.,   p.  20. 

2  Martineau,  T.  of  E.  T.,  Vol.  II.,  p.  405. 

3  Bradley,  E.  S.,  p.  280. 

4  Ibid,  p.  298. 


68  EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS. 

• 

We  may  sum  up  the  conclusions  we  have  reached  as  follows : — 
In  Evolution,  God  is  but  realizing  Himself,  His  will,  His 
purpose,  in  the  universe  which  He  has  created  according  to 
fixed  laws  and  for  a  definite  object.  In  more  scientific  language, 
the  highest  explanation  of  the  universe  is  teleological.  The  facts  of 
science,  and  the  reasoning  of  philosophy,  disclose  an  intelligent  and  a 
moral  order.  The  universe  is  best  understood  in  the  light  of  the 
ideal :  there  are  ideal  implications  throughout,  that  express  themselves, 
particularly  in  the  moral  realm,  in  ethical  values  and  in  ethical  judg- 
ments. An  Evolutionistic  explanation  of  the  universe  does  not  lead 
necessarily  to  a  utilitarian  ethics,  because  of  the  ideal  factors  in- 
volved. The  ideal  remains  the  chief  element  in  the  moral ;  and  an 
explanation  of  the  origin  of  the  moral  that  does  not  take  into  due 
account  this  factor,  is  not  a  complete  explanation  of  the  origin  of 
morality.  The  chief  intrinsic  factor  has  been  omitted.  It  is  like 
the  play  of  Hamlet  with  Hamlet  left  out.  Morality  is  not  fully 
understood,  its  character  not  completely  accounted  for,  until  it  is 
carried  back,  or  up,  to  its  source  and  origin  in  the  nature  and  will  of 
the  Ground  of  all  existence,  the  Spring  of  all  progress,  the  Cause  of 
all  development,  the  Mind  and  Heart  and  Will  of  an  omnipotent, 
omniscient  and  eternal  God. 

'Were  it  not,"  remarked  Martineau, ■  "for  this  last  and  culminat- 
ing stage,  the  evolution  even  of  human  conduct  would  never  earn 
even  the  name  of  moral  at  all.  So  long  as  it  is  pushed  on  from  be- 
hind, knowing  not  whither  it  goes ;  so  long  as  it  only  slips  more  and 
more  happily  into  the  groove  of  movement  and  advance,  it  is  simply 
success  without  a  particle  of  character." 

"Not  till  this  necessary  causation  is  replaced  by  the  free,  and 
for  the  spontaneous  is  substituted  the  voluntary,  not  till  the  'selec- 
tion' passes  from  Nature  to  Thought,  and  is  determined  propheti- 
cally for  an  end,  instead  of  mechanically  from  the  beginning,  does 
the  progressive  change  in  human  action  and  in  social  laws  become 
any  more  moral  than,  in  the  pigeon,  the  acquisition  of  his  tumbling 
trick  or  the  growth  of  his  portentous  crop.  And  when  the  trans- 
ference of  the  process  to  the  Will  has  taken  place,  the  theory  of 
evolution  is  no  longer  an  hypothesis  in  natural  history,  but  merges  in 
the  conception  of  indefinite  possible  approach  to  moral  perfection.". 

1  T.  of  E.   T.,  p.  406. 


EVOLUTIONISM    AND    IDEALISM    IN    ETHICS.  go 

Thus  Evolutionism  and  Idealism  in  Ethics,  supposed  to  be  so 
contrary,  and  even  diametrically  opposed,  to  one  another,  not  merely 
converge  in  many  particulars,  but  merge,  and  absolutely  blend,  in 
the  unification  of  morality  with  religion,  through  the  identification  of 
Evolution  with  Self-Realization  of  Conscious  Will.  Their  differences 
and  discordances  are  reconciled,  and  completely  harmonized,  with  the 
uttering  of  that  one  word,  and  the  attaining,  though  by  different 
paths,  to  that  sublime  thought,  which  is  the  summit  and  crown  of 
speculation  as  of  life, — the  Word  of  Words,  the  Thought  of 
Thoughts,  the  Fact  of  Facts;  Ground  of  all  Reality,  Basis  of  all 
Progress,  Goal  of  all  Development;  Sanction  of  all  Morality,  Ideal 
of  all  Religion ;  Substance,  Mind,  Spirit,  Reason ;  Generalization  of 
all  particulars,  and  of  every  generalization  the  Highest  Generaliza- 
tion ;  Absolutely  Supreme  Unifying  Principle  and  Essence  and 
Energy,— GOD ! 

"That  God  which  ever  lives  and  loves, 
One  God,  one  law,  one  element, 
And  one  far-off,  divine  event 
To  which  the  whole  creation  moves." 


,    ■••.■' 


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